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I. INTRODUCTION

Much has been written about the Americans with Disabilities
Act's (ADA) requirement that an employer provide qualified, but
disabled, individuals with a reasonable accommodation, if
accommodation is necessary to allow the individual to perform the
essential functions of the position that he or she holds or seeks.' For
example, it is beyond cavil under the ADA that a school district
would be required to provide a teacher who possesses the necessary
education, skills, and certification, but who suffers from a
degenerative disease that impairs his or her ability to walk, with a
classroom near the first floor entrance to the building or, if the
teacher is assigned to an upper floor, a classroom near an elevator.
Much less, however, has been said about the converse of this issue.
Specifically, scant case law and commentary exists concerning
whether an employer must provide a reasonable accommodation to

1. See, e.g., W. Robert Gray, The Essential Functions Limitation on the Civil Rights of
People with Disabilities and John Rawls's Concept of Justice, 22 N.M. L. REV. 295 (1992);
Michel Lee, Searchingfor Patterns and Anomalies in the ADA Employment Constellation: Who
Is a Qualified Individual with a Disability and What Accommodations Are Courts Really
Demanding? 13 LAB. LAW. 149 (1997); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 47 GA. L. REV. 527, 544 n.93 (2013) (collecting scholarship on
the duty to provide reasonable accommodation under the ADA); Mark C. Weber,
Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119 (2011); Jeffrey 0.
Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable
Accommodation and Undue Hardshipin the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1423 (1991); Bruce M. Familant, Comment, The Essential Functions of Being a Lawyer with a
Non-Visible Disability: On the Wings of a Kiwi Bird, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 517 (1998). For
the view of a vocational expert on the essential function and reasonable accommodation issue,
see ROBERT A. THRUSH, ADA ESSENTIAL FUNCTION IDENTIFICATION: A DEFINITIVE
APPLICATION OF TITLE 1 (1993).
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an employee or applicant who is qualified in that he or she can
perform the essential functions of a position, with or without
reasonable accommodation, but who needs a reasonable
accommodation to satisfy job prerequisites - such as education,
experience, skills, or licensing - mandated by the employer or state or
federal authorities.2 Thus, there has been far less discussion - and
both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and
courts addressing the issue have been far less clear - about whether
that same school district would be required to provide a teacher who
indisputably can present lessons, manage a classroom, and interact
with colleagues and students' parents and guardians with an
accommodation so that he or she could obtain additional education in
order to satisfy internal school district or state-imposed licensing
requirements.3 This Article will discuss this job prerequisite
qualification issue and will ultimately conclude that the ADA
imposes a reasonable accommodation requirement on an employer
under these latter circumstances - albeit under certain limitations
consistent with the ADA's other substantive requirements.
Part II of this article delineates the statutory and regulatory
scheme underlying the ADA as it pertains to defining qualified
individuals with disabilities and the duty to reasonably accommodate
such individuals, focusing on the ADA's statutory text and the
EEOC's regulations interpreting it.4 Part III discusses the relatively
scant case law addressing the job prerequisites and reasonable
accommodation issue, with emphasis on the district court's and Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals' decisions in Johnson v. Board of Trustees of
Boundary County School DistrictNo. 101.' Part IV analyzes the ADA
2. The few articles written on the subject are cursory, practitioner-oriented, and either
summarize the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Johnson v. Board of Trustees of Boundary
County School District No. 101, 666 F.3d 561 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that an employer has no
duty to reasonably accommodate an employee who did not satisfy a job prerequisite - in that
case, hold a current state-issued teaching certificate), see, e.g., Frank C. Morris, Jr., Selected
Developments Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, in 1 AM. LAW INST., CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 131 (2012), available at <http://files.ali-cle.org/files/
coursebooks/pdf/CU004_chapter 56.pdf>, or discuss cases that blur (arguably, appropriately)
the difference between job prerequisites and essential functions. See Morris, supra (citing
Colon-Fontanez v. Municipality of San Juan, 660 F.3d 17 (1th Cir. 2011)).
3. The above-discussed examples are taken from the school district employment context
- a milieu where, because of state- or employer-mandated education, training and/or licensing
requirements, both the job prerequisites issue and the essential function issue are invariably
present. However, the issue of whether an employer must provide a reasonable accommodation
to employees to assist them in satisfying job prerequisites may arise in any employment context
where the employer or state imposes job-related prerequisites.
4. See infra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
5. No. CV-09-61-N-BLW, 2010 WL 530070 (D. Idaho Feb. 9, 2010), aff'd, 666 F.3d 561
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statutory and regulatory scheme concerning the issue.' It concludes
that, although the plain language of the ADA and its legislative
history, including the House and Senate Reports accompanying the
statute and its statutory predecessor, section 504 of the federal
Rehabilitation Act, militate in favor of a conclusion that an individual
is qualified under the ADA if he or she can satisfy all job
prerequisites (and essential functions of a position) with a reasonable
accommodation, neither the ADA's plain language nor legislative
history definitively resolve the job prerequisites/reasonable
accommodation issue. It further concludes that, like the ADA's plain
language and legislative history, the EEOC's regulations and
guidances are less than clear on the job prerequisites/reasonable
accommodation issue, but that the position taken by the EEOC in its
amicus curiae brief during appellate proceedings in the Johnson case
is, in essence and with only slight modification, the standard that
should be used to resolve the issue.' Part V proposes that standard,
i.e. that individuals with a disability will be otherwise qualified under
the ADA - and employers will have a duty to reasonably
accommodate such individuals - when they can meet all job
prerequisites of the position they hold or seek, except for any job
prerequisite that they are unable to satisfy because of their disability,
where a reasonable accommodation will enable them to satisfy the
job prerequisite.! It also discusses why this proposed standard is
consistent with the purposes of the ADA and remedies the recurrent
judicial tendency to improperly narrow the class of ADA claimants
and thereby avoid reasonable accommodation analysis.0 It further
discusses why the standard would balance the legitimate interests of
employers and individuals with disabilities." And, it discusses how the
factual circumstances underlying the relevant judicial decisions would
be resolved under the proposed standard.12 Part VI concludes by
suggesting that, at the very least, the EEOC should make clear that
the ADA requires that employers reasonably accommodate
employees or applicants vis-A-vis job prerequisites by affirming and
(9th Cir.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

2011); see infra notes 28-111 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 112-60 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 112-43 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 144-60 and accompanying text.
See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 169-80 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 181-205 and accompanying text.
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restating its litigation position in Johnson by including the proposed
standard in its regulations and guidances."
II. THE ADA AND THE EEOC REGULATIONS: THE STATUTORY
AND REGULATORY SCHEME RELATING TO QUALIFIED
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, QUALIFICATION STANDARDS/JOB
SELECTION CRITERIA AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS

Congress enacted the ADA in 1990,14 with an effective date in
1992," and amended the Act in 200816 in response to several

restrictive Supreme Court decisions. In both instances, Congress
assigned the administration of the Act to the EEOC." In its most
fundamental aspect, the ADA was designed to remedy and eliminate
discrimination - particularly in the workplace, but also in other
critical facets of everyday life - against disabled, but qualified,
individuals by requiring that employers provide reasonable
accommodations to individuals covered by the Act.1 9 Thus, in the
Findings and Purposes provision of the ADA, Congress found,
among other things, "that discrimination against individuals with
disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment," and "that
the continu[ed] existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination
and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to
compete on an equal basis ... and costs the United States billions of
dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and

13. See infra notes 206-212 and accompanying text.
14. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (Supp. II 2008)).
15. Id. § 108, 104 Stat. at 337; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111 note - Effective Date.
16. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
17. See H.R. REP. No. 110-730, at 5 (2008), cited in Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric.
Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Jeannette Cox,
Crossroadsand Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85 IND. L. J. 187, 201-02 (2010).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (Supp. II 2008) provides that "the Commission shall issue
regulations in an acceptable format to carry out [the ADA] in accordance with subchapter II of
chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code." 42 U.S.C. § 12111 defines "Commission" as "the Equal
Employment Opportunities Commission."
19. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination:The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructionof the Definition of Disability,
42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 583 n.869 (1997) (quoting Kinney v. Yerusalim, 812 F. Supp. 547, 551
(E.D. Pa. 1993) ("The ADA is a remedial statute, designed to eliminate discrimination against
the disabled in all facets of society.")), aff'd, 9 F.3d 1067 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Michelle A.
Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potentialof Employment DiscriminationLaw, 62 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 3, 22 (2005) (stating that once a plaintiff proves he or she is disabled and
qualified, the plaintiff "is within the ADA's protected class and .. . the employer is required to
redesign workplace policies, practices, equipment, and procedures").
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nonproductivity."2 0 Specifically,
provisions state as follows:

the

ADA's

anti-discrimination

(a) No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment."

(b) As used in subsection (a), the term "discriminate" includes
(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee,
unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity; or
(6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other
selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an
individual with a disability or a class of individuals with
disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria,
as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the
position in question and is consistent with business necessity.
The ADA further provides a defense to a charge of discrimination
under the Act, stating that
[i]t may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this
chapter that an alleged application of qualification standards, tests,
or selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out or
otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has
been shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by
reasonable accommodation, as required under this subchapter.

20. 42 U.S.C. § 12101; see also Laura F. Rothstein, Reflections on Disability
DiscriminationPolicy - 25 Years, 22 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 147, 158 (2000).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Under the ADA, "[t]he term 'disability' means, with respect to
an individual . .. a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual; . .. a record of such an impairment; or.. . being regarded as having
such an impairment... ." Id. § 12102(1)(A). Under the 2008 amendments to the ADA,
"'[m]ajor life activities' include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing,
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working." Id. § 12102(1)(B).
Under those same amendments, Congress provided that "[t]he definition of disability in this
chapter shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter." Id. § 12102(4)(A).
22. Id. §H 12112(b)(5)(A), (b)(6). The EEOC has essentially replicated §§ 12112(b)(5) and
(b)(6) in regulations promulgated at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (2013) and § 1630.10, respectively.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
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The ADA defines "qualified individual with a disability" to
mean "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires....
[C]onsideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what
functions of the job are essential."2 The EEOC has expanded upon
this statutory definition, defining "qualified individual with a
disability" as one who "satisfies the requisite skills, experience,
education and other job-related requirements of the employment
position such individual holds or desires, and [who], with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
such position."2 According to the EEOC, the "essential functions" of
a job are the "fundamental job duties," not including "the marginal
functions of the position." 6
Under the ADA, a "reasonable accommodation" includes,
among other things, "job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modification of examinations, training materials or policies, the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations for individuals with disabilities."27
4

2

III. THE CASES

Four reported case, with varying factual scenarios, illustrate the
complexities and nuances inherent in analyzing the essential function,
job prerequisite, qualification standards/job selection criteria, and
reasonable accommodation issues under the ADA and the EEOC
regulations interpreting it.
In McDonald v. Menino 28 two municipal employees, one who

suffered from kidney disease and one who was blind and confined by
cerebral palsy to a wheelchair, moved outside of the city of Boston so
that they could obtain necessary care and accessible housing for their
medical conditions which they could not affordably obtain in the
city. 29 After the city fired them for failing to comply with a municipal

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
No. 96-10825-RGS, 1997 WL 106955 (D. Mass. Jan. 3, 1997).
Id. at *1.
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ordinance requiring city employees to reside within the city limits, the
two employees brought ADA claims against the city of Boston and
various city officials.30 The defendants moved to dismiss on the
ground that the ordinance was facially neutral because it did not
exclude disabled individuals from city employment. The district court
denied the motion, finding and concluding that the plaintiffs were
disabled,31 and addressing the qualified individual - and, specifically,
essential function - issue as follows:

A person with a disability must be able to perform the
essential functions of the job that he or she holds or desires, with or
without reasonable accommodation, in order to merit the
protections of the ADA.

...

Defendants argue that because

residency is such a function, plaintiffs are unable "to meet all of
[their job] requirements in spite of [their] handicap." This is the
heart of the defendants' case. Can a residency requirement be
defined as an "essential job function" for purposes of the
ADA? ... Some. job requirements, like regular attendance,
punctuality, and sobriety, are so fundamental to the workplace that
they are, for all practical purposes, deemed essential as a matter of
law. However, other requirements, like residency or the payment of
local property taxes, might not be deemed as indispensable by a
factfinder viewing the matter from the perspective of the ADA....
The issue, it should be stressed, is not whether the City has acted
reasonably or unreasonably in promulgating the residency
requirement as a condition of municipal employment. The case law
seems to place the City well within its rights in doing so. The issue

rather is whether the ADA might compel the32granting of the
plaintiffs' request for an accommodation (waiver).
The court next discussed the special nature of the ADA's
reasonable accommodation requirement in the broader context of
anti-discrimination laws, as well as the ADA's impact on otherwise
neutral job selection criteria:
The ADA mandate that employers must accommodate sets it apart
from most
other anti-discrimination
legislation.
Race
discrimination statutes mandate equality of treatment . .
In
contrast, an employer who treats a disabled employee the same as a
non-disabled employee may violate the ADA. When an
individual's disability creates a barrier to employment
opportunities, the ADA requires employers to consider whether a
reasonable accommodation could eliminate that barrier.
Accordingly, job criteria that even unintentionally screen out, or
tend to screen out, an individual with a disability ... because of
their disability, may not be used unless the employer demonstrates
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
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that criteria, as used by the employer, are job-related to the
position .. . and are consistent with business necessity.33
Lastly, the court quickly dispatched the defendants' factual
arguments, stating as follows:
[D]efendants claim that granting the plaintiffs a waiver would
violate the residency policy, subject the City to liability, and impose
an undue hardship. That an exception to a policy that allows no
exceptions would be a violation of that same policy is, of course, a
tautology. How an exemption of the plaintiffs would inflict liability
on the City, the defendants do not explain. Nor do they identify the
specific hardship that the City will endure. There is no claim that
the City would incur a significant expense in adapting the working
conditions of either job to the plaintiffs' needs. Both plaintiffs
successfully performed their jobs for ten years without any
accommodation of this kind. More likely, the City fears the
deleterious precedent that an exception for these plaintiffs might
pose in its efforts to enforce the residency policy on other
employees. Nothing in the record, at least as yet, demonstrates that
the City has in fact attempted such enforcement on a citywide
basis."
Thus, because plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a claim for relief
under the ADA, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss.
In Williams v. United Insurance Co. of America,36 plaintiff
Williams, who had been discharged from her job as a door-to-door
insurance salesperson after a series of leg injuries prevented her from
continuing to work in a job that required walking, filed suit against
her former employer under the ADA. Williams alleged that the
company should have promoted her to sales manager and that, if she
were not qualified for that job, it should have trained her for the
position.38 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the employer, reasoning that
[i]f an otherwise disabled person can perform to the employer's
satisfaction with a reasonable accommodation to her disability, the
employer is required to provide the accommodation.... But the
employer is not required to give the disabled employee preferential
treatment, as . . by waiving his normal requirements for the job in
question. That is what the plaintiff is seeking. She wants a job, that
of sales manager, for which she is not qualified.
33. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. at *4 (citations omitted). Indeed, counsel for the defendants acknowledged at oral
argument on the motion to dismiss that many city employees were exempt from the residency
requirement under provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at *4 n.11.
35. Id. at *4.
36. 253 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 2001).
37. Id. at 281.
38. Id. at 281-82.
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But here is the novelty in the case. The plaintiff wants training
that will equip her with the qualifications for the job of sales
manager that at present she lacks. If all she wanted was an
opportunity to compete for the job by enrolling in a training
program offered to aspirants for sales manager positions, the
employer could not refuse her on the ground that she was disabled
unless her disability prevented her from participating in the
program or serving in the job for which it is designed to qualify
participants. But our plaintiff is seeking special training, not offered
to nondisabled employees, to enable her to qualify. The [ADA]
does not require employers to offer special training to disabled
employees. It is not an affirmative action statute in the sense of
requiring an employer to give preferential treatment to a disabled
employee merely on account of the employee's disability, though it
does of course create an entitlement that disabled employees and
applicants for employment would not otherwise have to
consideration of ways of enabling them to work despite their
disability. The burden that would be placed on employers if
disabled persons could demand special training to fit them for new
jobs would be excessive and is not envisaged or required by the
Act. The duty of reasonable accommodation may require the
employer to reconfigure the workplace to enable a disabled worker
to cope with her disability, but it does not require the employer to
reconfigure the disabled worker.39
In Bates v. United Parcel Services, Inc.,40 a class of hearingimpaired employees and job applicants who could not pass a
Department of Transportation (DOT) hearing standard imposed by
United Parcel Services (UPS) on all of its package-car drivers sued
UPS, alleging violations of the ADA and California state law.41 The
district court found in favor of the plaintiffs on the ADA liability
issues and eventually awarded them injunctive relief.42 Reviewing the
matter en banc, the Ninth Circuit vacated in part, reversed in part,
and remanded the matter to the district court for further
*43
consideration.
The court of appeals first characterized the UPS job selection

39. Id. at 282-83 (citations omitted); see also Warren v. Volusia Cnty., 188 F. App'x 859,
863 (11th Cir. 2006) ("retraining is not a reasonable accommodation" under the ADA); Riley v.
Weyerhaeuser Paper Co., 898 F. Supp. 324, 328 (W.D. N.C. 1995) ("[I]t appears to the Court
that imposing an obligation on an employer to retrain a disabled employee in a new line of work
goes far beyond the intended scope of the ADA to prevent employment discrimination against
qualified individuals with disabilities."); Howell v. Michelin Tire Corp., 860 F. Supp. 1488, 1492
(M. D. Ala. 1994) ("Obviously, the employer is not required to reassign a disabled person to a
vacant position unless the disabled person is qualified for the position.").
40. 511 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
41. Id. at 981-82.
42. Id. at 982.
43. Id.
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criteria and delineated the ADA's qualified individual and
discrimination standards as follows:
The hearing standard at issue here is a facially discriminatory
qualification standard because it focuses directly on an individual's
disabling or potentially disabling condition.
A "qualified individual" is "an individual with a disability who,

with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the

essential functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires." . . . "If a disabled person cannot perform a job's
'essential functions' (even with a reasonable accommodation), then
the ADA's employment protections do not apply." "If, on the
other hand, a person can perform a job's essential functions, and
therefore is a qualified individual, then the ADA prohibits
discrimination" with respect to the employment actions outlined in
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
Discrimination under the ADA includes the use of
"qualification standards, employment tests or other selection

criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a
disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the

standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered
entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is
consistent with business necessity."
Where an across-the-board safety "qualification standard" is
invoked, the question then becomes what proof is required with
respect to being a "qualified individual," that is, one who can
perform the job's essential functions. Before an employee can
challenge an employer's qualification standard, however, an
employee must first prove that he is a "qualified individual" within
the meaning of the ADA, that is, one who can perform the ob's
essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.
The Court next summarized the contentions of the parties.45 The
named plaintiffs and other plaintiff class members contended that
they were qualified individuals under the ADA in that they were able
to perform all of the essential functions of the package-car driver
position, including being a safe driver, notwithstanding that they
could not meet DOT hearing standards due to their disability.4 The
plaintiffs also contended that meeting DOT hearing standards,
although a job requirement, was not an essential function of the
position.47 In contrast, UPS contended that that the plaintiffs were not
44. Id. at 988, 989 (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 989-90.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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qualified individuals under the ADA because they could not meet
UPS's job requirement that all drivers satisfy the DOT hearing
standard and because they could not perform an essential function of
the job, i.e. obtain DOT certification to drive commercial vehicles.4 8
UPS also argued that plaintiffs were required to demonstrate they
were safe drivers, not only in the sense that they had clean driving
records but also in the sense that they were safe drivers despite being
hearing impaired.4 9
The court then adopted the EEOC's two-step approach for
determining whether an individual is qualified under the ADA,
stating that:
[q]ualification for a position is a two-step inquiry. The court first
examines whether the individual satisfies the "requisite skill,
experience, education and other job-related requirements" of the
position. The court then considers whether the individual "can
perform the essential functions of such position" with or without a
reasonable accommodation. 0
Applying this standard, the court upheld the district court's
determination that the relevant named and class member plaintiffs
satisfied UPS's job selection criteria.' Specifically, the court found
that "[t]he package-car driver job requires an applicant to meet UPS's
threshold seniority requirements for the package-car driver position,
complete an application, be at least twenty-one years of age, possess a
valid driver's license, and have a clean driving record by UPS's local
standards." 2 Based on these findings, the court concluded that the
district court's determination that the named plaintiffs had met these
prerequisites was not clearly erroneous.5
Drawing a critical distinction between qualifications standards
for and the essential functions of a position, the court delineated the
applicable legal standard as follows:
To prove that he is "qualified," the applicant also must show
that he can perform the "essential functions" of the job....
"Essential functions" are not to be confused with "qualification
standards," which an employer may establish for a certain position.
Whereas "essential functions" are basic "duties," "qualification
standards" are "personal and professional attributes" that may
include "physical, medical [and] safety" requirements. The
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 990.
Id.
Id. at 990.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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difference is crucial.
The statute does not require that a person meet each of an
employer's established "qualification standards," however, to show
that he is "qualified." And, indeed, it would make little sense to
require an ADA plaintiff to show that he meets a qualification
standard that he undisputedly cannot meet because of his disability
and that forms the very basis of his discrimination challenge.54
The court further noted:
While the plain language of the statute suffices to support our
conclusion, it bears noting that the legislative history favors our
reading as well. One of the Senate committee reports states that the
qualification standard section of the ADA was meant to apply to "a
person with a disability [who] applies for a job and meets all
selection criteria except one that he or she cannot meet because of a
disability." S.Rep. No. 101-116, at 37 (1989) (emphasis added). The
legislative history also cites with approval Prewitt v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 306 (5th Cir.1981) (cited by H. Rep. No. 101485(111), at 42) (1990) reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 446, a
Rehabilitation Act case that adopted the same prima facie case
standard adopted here. See Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 306 (requiring the
plaintiff to prove as part of his prima facie case "that he is qualified
for the position under all but the challenged criteria" (emphasis
added)).
The court then upheld the district court's determinations
concerning the essential functions of the package-car position, stating:
At trial the parties agreed that two of the "essential functions"
of the package-car driver position are (1) "the ability to
communicate effectively" and (2) "the ability to drive safely."
Only the second essential function, "safe driving," is at issue in
this appeal. UPS argues that "hearing" at a level sufficient to pass
the DOT hearing standard is either a stand-alone essential job
function or part and parcel of being a safe driver. This point
illustrates the critical difference between a job's essential functions
-

"effective

communication"

or

"safe

driving"

-

versus

a

qualification standard based on "personal or professional
attributes," such as hearing at a certain level. The question, then, is
whether plaintiffs established that they meet the essential function
of safe driving.56
The court concluded that district court had correctly determined
that the named plaintiffs had met UPS's threshold job requirements
and were, therefore, otherwise qualified individuals under the ADA.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 990 (citations omitted).
Id. at 990 n.6 (citations omitted).
Id. at 991, 992.
Id. at 992.
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The court remanded the matter for additional proceedings before the
district court concerning whether the named plaintiffs, as qualified
individuals, could perform the essential function of safely driving a
package car and concerning reasonable accommodation issues."
Finally, in Johnson v. Board of Trustees of Boundary County
School District No. 101,59 plaintiff Johnson filed a complaint against
defendants Board of Trustees of Boundary County School District
(the Board) and the Superintendent of the School District concerning
the Board's decision to terminate her employment after a major
depressive episode prevented her from completing the required
course work to renew her teaching certificate.60 Johnson asserted a
number of claims, including claims for disability discrimination in
violation of the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA), the Rehabilitation
Act, and the ADA." As to her disability discrimination claims,
Johnson contended that the defendants discriminated against her in
violation of the IHRA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA by
failing to reasonably accommodate her disability when they refused
to seek provisional certification on her behalf from the Idaho State
Board of Education (SBE). After Johnson and the defendants filed
cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on each of Johnson's
claims.62
As to Johnson's disability discrimination claims, the court
dismissed Johnson's ADA claim, based on Johnson's admission that
the claim was time barred. 63 Applying an ADA analysis to Johnson's
IHRA and Rehabilitation Act claims, the court granted summary
judgment to defendants on those claims as well.6 The court held that,
because Johnson did not possess a valid Idaho teaching certificate at
the time she requested accommodation, she was not a "qualified"
employee and, therefore, not entitled to a reasonable accommodation
under the ADA. In so holding, the court first stated as follows:
The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against a
"qualified" employee with a disability, and requires employers to
58. Id. at 994. The court also remanded the matter to the district court for an evaluation of
UPS's business necessity defense. Id. at 997.
59. No. CV-09-61-N-BLW, 2010 WL 530070 (D. Idaho Feb. 9, 2010).
60. Id. at *1.
61. Id.
62. Id. at *2.
63. Id. at *7.
64. Id. at *10.
65. Id. at **8-9.
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provide "reasonable accommodations" to the known physical or
mental limitations of such an individual. Johnson asserts that
approval of her request to seek provisional certification would have
been a reasonable accommodation....
However, to survive summary judgment, an ADA plaintiff
must first establish, inter alia, that she was a "qualified individual."
Johnson's claim fails because at the time she requested
accommodation, she was no longer "qualified" to hold a teaching
position in the State of Idaho.66
The court next recited the two-step inquiry regarding job
prerequisites and the ability to perform the essential functions of the
position, with or without reasonable accommodation, set forth in
EEOC regulations and Interpretative Guidance.67 The court also
noted that the two-step inquiry had been adopted by the Ninth
Circuit in Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,68 and further
acknowledged that, in Bates, "the Ninth Circuit held that the plain
language of 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) 'does not require that a person meet
each of an employer's established "qualification standards" . . . to

show that he is "qualified."'
The court, however, distinguished Bates and held that, because
Johnson's teaching certificate had expired, she could no longer
perform the essential functions of her teaching position, was therefore
not a "qualified individual" within the meaning of the ADA, and, as
such, was not entitled to a reasonable accommodation from the
defendants:
Johnson's reliance on Bates is misplaced. In this case, the
qualification standard at issue was not established by the employer.
Rather, it is a statutorily mandated certification requirement
imposed by the Idaho Legislature. Thus, in this case, the first and
second parts of the ADA qualification inquiry dovetail. Section
12111(8) defines a "qualified individual" as "an individual who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essentialfunctions of the employment position that such individual

holds or desires." .. . As noted above, every elementary and
secondary school teacher[] in Idaho must possess a valid teaching
certificate:
Every person who is employed to serve in any elementary or
secondary school in the capacity of teacher, supervisor,
administrator, education specialist, school nurse or school
librarian shall be required to have and to hold a certificate

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at **7-8 (citations omitted).
Id. at **8-9; see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(m), pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(m) (2013).
511 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007).
Johnson, 2010 WL 530070, at *8 (quoting Bates, 511 F.3d at 990).
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issued under authority of the state board of education, valid
for the service being rendered ....
I.C § 33-1201. Accordingly, when Johnson's teaching
certificate expired she could no longer perform the "essential
functions" of the position because she was precluded by State law
from doing so.
Johnson nevertheless argues that she could have performed
the essential functions of the position had the Board reasonably
accommodated her disability by approving her request to seek
provisional certification. However, reasonable accommodation is
only due to qualified individuals. Whether or not an individual is a
qualified under the ADA is determined at the time the adverse
employment decision was made. It is undisputed that Johnson's
teaching certificate expired on or before September 1, 2007, five
days prior to the September 6 provisional certification hearing and
45 days before the October 16 due process hearing. Thus, at the
time of any adverse employment decision, Johnson was unable to
perform the essential functions of the position and was not a
qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA, the IHRA, or
the Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, the Board was not obligated
to reasonably accommodate her disability.
Lastly, in dicta, the court addressed whether Johnson's request
that the defendants seek provisional certification on her behalf
constituted a reasonable accommodation under the disability
discrimination law. The court first noted that the "ISBE did not
require, as it could have, that the Board certify that there were no
certificated persons available before it could request provisional
certification," 7 ' and further noted that "[a]s long as a reasonable
accommodation available to the employer could have plausibly
enabled a handicapped employee to adequately perform his job, an
employer is liable for failing to attempt that accommodation." 7 2 The
court concluded that the Board could have identified other
certificated employees in the District, but still requested provisional
certification for Johnson as a way of accommodating her disability
under the disability discrimination statutes.7 ' Based on these findings
and conclusions, the district court believed "it [was] plausible that
ISBE may have granted the provisional certification." 74
The district court, however, concluded that, because Johnson was
not a qualified individual under the ADA, the defendants had no
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at **8-9 (citations omitted).
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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-

duty to reasonably accommodate her."
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling
on Johnson's disability discrimination claims, with two judges
Circuit Judge O'Scannlain and District Judge Kendall sitting by
designation - agreeing to a majority opinion and one judge - Circuit
Judge Paez -concurring in part and dissenting in part. 6 The majority
first found and concluded that, because the ADAAA did not have
retroactive effect, the version of the ADA in effect in 2007, i.e. when
Johnson was terminated, applied to the case. 7 The majority also
noted that, "[f]or purposes of summary judgment, the Board [did] not
contest that Johnson [was] disabled"" and that "Johnson was
physically and mentally capable of performing the functions of a
special education teacher at the time it denied her request for
7

provisional authorization."7

In addition, the majority agreed with the district court that
Johnson's ADA claim was time-barred, but that her surviving
Rehabilitation Act and IHRA claims should be construed under
ADA law,o that Johnson had to show that she was a qualified
individual under the ADA at the time of the Board's alleged
discriminatory conduct," and that, under Bates, the Ninth Circuit had
adopted the two-step inquiry formulated by the EEOC concerning
whether an individual is qualified under the ADA." The majority
then characterized the Board's and Johnson's contentions.8 3
Specifically, the Board contended that Johnson's lack of legal
authorization to teach in Idaho rendered her unqualified pursuant to
75. Id. at *10.
76. Johnson v. Bd. of Trs. of Boundary Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 101, 666 F.3d 561 (9th Cir.
2011). Johnson did not appeal any other aspect of the district court's decision. Id. at 564.
77. Id. at 564 n.2.
78. Id. at 564 n.3.
79. Id. at 565.
80. Id. at 564 n.1.
81. Id. at 564.
82. Id. at 565. For a district court decision in the Ninth Circuit discussing the EEOC's twostep test concerning whether an individual with a disability is qualified under the ADA adopted
by the Ninth Circuit in Bates and Johnson, see Ward v. Vilsak, No. Civ-S-10-0376-KJM-KJN-PS,
2012 WL 996569, **1-2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2012). In addition to the Ninth Circuit, every other
federal court of appeals that has considered the question, albeit not discussing the specific issue
of whether an employer has a duty to reasonably accommodate an individual with a disability
who cannot satisfy a job prerequisite, has adopted the EEOC's two-step approach on the
qualified individual issue. See Colon-Fontanez v. Municipality of San Juan, 660 F.3d 17, 33 (1st
Cir. 2011); Budde v. Kane Cnty. Forest Pres., 597 F.3d 860, 862 (7th Cir. 2010); EEOC v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 477 F.3d 561, 568 (8th Cir. 2007); Tate v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 268 F.3d 989,
993 (10th Cir. 2001); Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055, 1062 (11th Cir. 2000).
83. Johnson,666 F.3d at 565.
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the first step of the two-step qualification inquiry.84 In response,
Johnson contended that the Court was required to consider
reasonable accommodations in determining whether she satisfied the
job prerequisites for the teaching position that she sought and had
previously held. 5 Johnson further argued that because she could have
obtained legal authorization to teach had the Board granted her
request for accommodation, she had satisfied the first step of the
8quiry.
qualification
The majority sided with the Board (and the district court) on the
qualification inquiry, initially focusing on the above-discussed EEOC
regulations:
[W]e note that the first step of the qualification inquiry, unlike the
second step, contains no reference to reasonable accommodation. If
the EEOC had intended to require employers to provide
reasonable accommodation to ensure that disabled individuals can
satisfy the job prerequisites, in addition to the essential job
functions, it presumably could have said so in the regulation. That
the EEOC declined to include any reference to reasonable
accommodation in the first step suggests that such omission was
deliberate.87

The majority next buttressed its analysis and conclusion by
referencing the EEOC's interpretative guidance concerning the twostep inquiry and employer's duty to reasonably accommodate an
individual with a disability:
Our reading is supported by the EEOC's interpretive guidance
on Title I ("Guidance"). In discussing the qualification inquiry, the
Guidance explains that "[t]he first step is to determine if the
individual satisfies the prerequisites for the position, such as
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. Johnson had held an Idaho teaching certificate, issued by the SBE and valid for the
subjects that she taught, from September 1, 2002 to September 1, 2007; however, as discussed
above, it lapsed when Johnson, due to a major depressive episode, failed to complete the
necessary course work to renew her certificate. Id. at 563; see also supra note 60 and
accompanying text. But, as described in the majority opinion,
School districts in Idaho could apply for provisional authorization to hire teachers who
lacked the appropriate certification by submitting a letter of request signed by the
superintendent and chair of the board of trustees explaining the need for provisional
authorization, "outlining the 'good faith effort' the district made in attempting to hire
someone with appropriate certification," and specifying the teacher's qualifications.
Upon ISBE approval, the teacher would be allowed to teach for a nonrenewable oneyear term.
Johnson, 666 F.3d at 563; see also IDAHO STATE BD. OF EDUC., SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVE
AUTHORIZATION/ROUTES TO CERTIFICATION (2009), available at <http://www.sde.idaho.gov/

site/teachercertification/docs/altroutesdocs/Summary%20of%20Alternative%20Authorizati
ons%20and%2ORoutes%20to%20Certification%20in%20Idaho.pdf>.
87. Johnson, 666 F.3d at 565 (citation omitted).
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possessing the appropriate educational background, employment
experience, skills, licenses, etc." Hence, "the first step in
determining whether an accountant who is a paraplegic is qualified
for a certified public accountant (CPA) position is to examine the
individual's credentials to determine whether the individual is a
licensed CPA." Absent from this discussion is any mention of a
requirement that the employer consider whether the individual
could become a licensed CPA with reasonable accommodation.
According to another section of the Guidance, "the obligation
to make reasonable accommodation is owed only to an individual
with a disability who is qualified within the meaning of § 1630.2(m)
in that he or she satisfies all the skill, experience, education and
other job-related selection criteria." The Guidance further provides
that "[a]n individual with a disability is 'otherwise qualified'... if
he or she is qualified for a job, except that, because of the disability,
he or she needs a reasonable accommodation to be able to perform
the job's essential functions." Such statements make clear that
unless a disabled individual independently satisfies the job
prerequisites, she is not "otherwise qualified," and the employer is
not obligated to furnish any reasonable accommodation that would
enable her to perform the essential job functions.

The majority concluded this portion of its analysis with an
example from the EEOC interpretative guidance indicating that a law
firm that requires all lawyers joining the firm to graduate from an
accredited law school and pass the bar exam would not owe a duty of
reasonable accommodation to an individual who had not met those
selection criteria.89 Specifically, the Court noted that "[a]gain, the

Guidance

explicitly

disclaims

any

requirement

of

providing

reasonable accommodation to disabled individuals who fail to meet
the job prerequisites on their own."90
The majority went on to respond to and reject two arguments
made on Johnson's behalf - one by Johnson herself and one by
amicus curiae EEOC. Johnson, although conceding (according to the
majority) that an individual who cannot satisfy job prerequisites is

generally not qualified under the first-step of the EEOC two-step
inquiry adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Bates, argued that "an
exception exists 'where the employer exercises significant control

over an individual's ability to obtain job-related qualifications."' 91 The
88. Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 566.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 566 n.6 (quoting Opening Brief of PlaintifflAppellant Trish Johnson, at 26,
Johnson, 666 F.3d 561 (July 21, 2010), available at 2010 WL 5162538). More precisely, Johnson
conceded only that
if an employer has no control over job-related qualifications such as degrees or
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majority disagreed, relying on the EEOC enforcement guidance and
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Williams - both to the effect that an
employer is not required under the ADA to provide an employee
with training so that he or she can become qualified.92
The EEOC, relying on a section of its interpretative guidance
providing that "selection criteria .

.

. related to an essential function

of the job may not be used to exclude an individual with a disability if
that individual could satisfy the criteria with the provision of a
the reasonable
that
reasonable accommodation," argued
accommodation issue must be considered under the first step (and
second step) of the qualification inquiry.9 3 The majority agreed that,
"in the context of a challenge to an employer's 'facially discriminatory
qualification standard,"' that "it would make little sense to require an
ADA plaintiff to show that he meets a qualification standard that he
undisputedly cannot meet because of his disability and that forms the
very basis of his discrimination challenge."94 The majority, however,
rejected the EEOC's argument, noting that Johnson had not
challenged the board's legal authorization requirement as a
discriminatory job prerequisite, but instead had based her
discrimination claim on the "analytically distinct" claim that the
board had failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.95 The
majority concluded that, because Johnson had neither alleged nor
shown that the certification standard was discriminatory in effect,
"the guidance section pertaining to discriminatory qualification
standards is inapposite." 96
Based on this analysis, the majority "reject[ed] Johnson's

professional certifications, both the Guidance and the plain language of the ADA
indicate that an individual who lacks those qualifications will not be "qualified."
That is because an employer in those circumstances cannot furnish the
accommodation that would make the individual "qualified."
Opening Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant Trish Johnson, at 25, Johnson, 666 F.3d 561 (July 21, 2010),
availableat 2010 WL 5162538.
92. Johnson, 666 F.3d at 566 n.6 (citing EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE No. 915.002, REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE
HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 20 (2002)) ("There is no

obligation for the employer to assist the individual to become qualified. Thus, the employer
does not have to provide training so that the employee acquires necessary skills to take a job.");
Williams v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 253 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that an employer
is not required to provide a disabled individual "training that will equip her with the
qualifications for the job . . . that at present she lacks")).
93. Id. at 566 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.10).
94. Id. at 566-67.
95. Id. at 567.
96. Id. at 566-67 (citations omitted).
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reliance on cases such as Bates and Rohr ... both of which involved
challenges to discriminatory qualification standards" 7 and concluded
as follows:
[A]n individual who fails to satisfy the job prerequisites cannot be
considered "qualified" within the meaning of the ADA unless she
shows that the prerequisite is itself discriminatory in effect.
Otherwise, the default rule remains that "the obligation to make
reasonable accommodation is owed only to an individual with a
disability who ... satisfies all the skill, experience, education and
other job-related selection criteria." Because Johnson does not
allege that the Board's legal authorization requirement was itself
discriminatory, her failure to satisfy such requirement rendered her
unqualified, and the Board was not required to accommodate her
disability. 8
Because of its conclusion on the qualification issue, the majority
did not consider the board's argument that Johnson's requested
accommodation, i.e. that the board apply to the SBE for a provisional
certificate on her behalf, was unreasonable under the ADA."
The concurring and dissenting judge, Circuit Judge Paez, agreed
with the majority that Johnson was not entitled to prevail on her
disability discrimination claims, but for different reasons. Judge Paez
agreed with the majority's decision affirming the grant of summary
judgment in favor of the board, but reached his decision on the
ground that the accommodation requested by Johnson - provisional
authorization allowing the board to hire an uncertificated teacher
was not within the board's authority to grant.'" Disagreeing with the
district court's dicta on the reasonable accommodation issue, Judge
Paez found and concluded that, under SBE policy, "provisional
authorization to hire an uncertified teacher is an accommodation of
last resort to local school districts, not an accommodation to a teacher
who does not possess the required certification."' Judge Paez further
noted that the authorization process did "not provide a school district
with the authority to waive the certification requirement by itself at
the request of an uncertified teacher" and that "only the [SBE] may
authorize provisional authorization."'0 2 As such, Judge Paez believed
that "[a]lthough provisional authorization was potentially available,
the District was not required to utilize the procedure to rehire
-

9

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 567 n.8.
at 567.
at 567 n.9.
at 567 (Paez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
at 568.
at 568-69.
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Johnson." 0 Judge Paez concluded concerning the reasonable
accommodation issue that, although it "might be a different case if
the District had created the certification requirement or if it had
independent authority and discretion to waive the certification
requirement so that it could rehire Johnson," Idaho's teacher
certification scheme vested those responsibilities in SBE.'" Under
those circumstances, Judge Paez believed that Johnson had "no basis
to complain that the District discriminated against her in violation of
the IHRA and the Rehabilitation Act when it declined to seek
provisional authorization from the state." 0
Judge Paez also disagreed with the majority on the "otherwise
qualified" issue. 06 Judge Paez initially identified the deferential
standard which courts must apply to an agency's interpretation of its
own regulations, pointing out that the Supreme Court had "held that
where a particular test 'is a creature of the [agency]'s own regulations,
[the agency's] interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence,
controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the

regulation"" 7 and had further made clear that "such deference is due
even where, as here, the agency's position is contained in an appellate

brief, so long as the agency is not attempting to defend its own past
actions."o"
Judge Paez next noted that "the EEOC, as amicus curiae, argues
that an employer has a duty to provide reasonable accommodation to

a prospective employee if that accommodation would allow the
person to become qualified for the position."'0 9 Judge Paez went on to
identify and reject the majority's arguments refusing to adopt the
position taken by the EEOC in the case, concluding concerning the
"otherwise qualified" issue as follows:
In sum, the EEOC's position expressed in its Amicus Brief is not
plainly erroneous, irrational, or inconsistent with either the ADA
or the EEOC's regulations and interpretive guidance. Although the
rule the majority proposes in Part III of the opinion is plausible, it
is contrary to the reasonable view of the EEOC, and we ought to
defer to the agency's reasonable position rather than attempt to
give our own interpretation to the EEOC's regulation and the
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 569.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 567-68, 569-71.
Id. at 569 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
Id. at 569-70 (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 462).
Id. at 570.
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governing statute. Because I see no reason to reject the EEOC's
position that employers have a duty to provide reasonable
accommodation to disabled individuals who could satisfy job
prerequisites with an accommodation, I would defer to that
.. 110
position."

However, because Judge Paez believed that "the District did not
have the authority to grant Johnson a provisional waiver to the
required state certification," he concurred in the majority's opinion

affirming the decision of the district court."'
IV. CRITIQUE
A. Plain LanguageAnalysis
The ADA is not a model of clarity - particularly concerning the
circumstances under which an individual will be deemed to be

otherwise qualified for the position that he or she holds or seeks and,
therefore, covered by the ADA's anti-discrimination provisions,
including its reasonable accommodation and job selection criteria
requirements." 2 As discussed previously, the express language of the
110. Id. at 571.
111. Id. Both during the Ninth Circuit proceedings and at the district court, Johnson argued
- and the evidentiary record supported her argument - that "the School District successfully
requested. . . provisional certifications as a routine matter." Opening Brief, supra note 91, at 6.
Thus, as pointed out by Johnson, "the School District approved two other requests for
provisional certification in the very same meeting where it denied that accommodation to
Johnson," id. at 34-35, and "the School District made at least twenty such requests between 2006
and 2009, including six additionalrequests in the same 2007-08 academic year, and nine requests
the year earlier," id. at 35. Or, as Johnson argued to the Ninth Circuit, "[a]ll that Johnson sought
is for the School District to petition for a one-year provisional teaching certificate-something it
had done for at least twenty other teachers over a three-year period - and to allow her to
continue in her position if the provisional certificate were gra[n]ted." Reply Brief of
Plaintiff/Appellant Trish Johnson, at 6, Johnson, 666 F.3d 561 (Oct. 6, 2010), available at 2010
WL 5162541. However, neither the majority or concurrence and dissent at the Ninth Circuit, nor
the district court mentioned these facts, analyzed their legal significance, or heeded Johnson's
argument.
112. In determining the meaning of congressional enactments like the ADA, courts (and
commentators) are governed and guided, respectively, by several well-settled principles of
statutory construction. Thus, in enforcing an act of Congress, courts must apply the plain
language of the statute, W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991) (quoting
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United
Stats, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("'[W]here, as here, the statute's language is plain, "the sole
function of the court is to enforce it according to its terms."')), should not resort to legislative
history to ascertain congressional intent. United States v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997); Conn.
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992), and must reject an agency's construction of the
statute if it is contrary to clear legislative intent. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ.,
550 U.S. 81, 93 (2007); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 & n.9 (1984). "In ascertaining the plain meaning of [a] statute, the Court must
look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the
statute as a whole." Sullivan v. Everhart, 499 U.S. 83, 89 (1990) (quoting K-Mart Corp. v.
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ADA (1) defines "qualified individual" with a disability to mean an
individual with a disability "who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires,""' (2)
requires an employer to "mak[e] reasonable accommodations to...
an otherwise qualified individual with a disability" unless to do so
would cause it an undue hardship,114 and (3) prohibits an employer
from "using qualification standards ... or other selection criteria that
screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a
class of individuals with disabilities" unless such standards or criteria
are job-related and compelled by business necessity."'
The plain language of § 12111(8) clearly requires an employer to
provide a "qualified individual" with a disability a reasonable
accommodation, if an accommodation will allow the individual to
perform the essential functions of a job. But what does the plain
language of § 12111(8) and the other, above-quoted ADA provisions
require of employers and employees concerning job prerequisites - a
term which, notably, does not appear in the ADA's statutory
language?
In Bates, the Ninth Circuit properly held that the plain language
of § 12111(8)'s definitional provision, because it refers only to an
"individual" with a disability (and not to an "otherwise qualified
individual with a disability" as in § 12112(b)(5)), "does not require
that a person meet each of an employer's established 'qualification
standards,'. . . to show that he is 'qualified.""' 6 This result was further
compelled by the plain language of § 12112(b)(6) - the antidiscrimination provision under which the Bates case was litigated
which again spoke only of prohibiting employer use of job
qualification standards or selection criteria that discriminated against
or tended to discriminate against "individuals with .. . or classes of
individuals with disabilities."" Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded the
Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)). If, however, the language of a statute is ambiguous, i.e.
reasonably subject to more than one interpretation, Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258
(2006), the court may look to the legislative history underlying the congressional enactment,
Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 236 n.5 (1991), Green v. Boch Laundry Machine Co.,
490 U.S. 504, 511 (1989), and must enforce an agency's interpretation which is based on a
permissible construction of the statute. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012); Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. II 2008).
114. Id. § 12112(b)(5).
115. Id. § 12112(b)(6).
116. Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 990 (9th Cir. 2007).
117. 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(6); Bates, 511 F.3d at 989; see also supra notes 44, 54 and
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case for evaluation of, among other things, whether a reasonable
accommodation under § 12113(a) was available to the Bates
plaintiffs.'18 In contrast, in Johnson, plaintiff Johnson litigated the case
as a failure to make a reasonable accommodation case under §
12112(b)(5), which requires an individual to be "otherwise qualified"
to receive a reasonable accommodation." 9 As a result, the Ninth
Circuit distinguished Bates on the grounds that Bates was a
qualification standards/job selection criteria case under § 12112(b)(6)
and held that Johnson's failure to satisfy a job prerequisite, i.e. hold a
current Idaho teaching certificate, made her unqualified for the
position
and,
therefore,
not entitled
to a reasonable
accommodation.1 20
From a plain language perspective, should the difference in the
specific ADA anti-discrimination provision relied upon by a plaintiff
lead to diametrically-opposite results concerning the employer's duty
to reasonably accommodate an employee or applicant? On the one
hand, probably not - particularly given that § 12111(8)'s definition of
a "qualified individual with a disability" is the starting point in the
analysis under both a section 12112(b)(6) qualification standards/job
selection criteria case and a § 12112(b)(5) reasonable accommodation
case and further given that there appears to be no meaningful
difference between the term "job selection criteria" under §
12112(b)(6) (as litigated in the Bates case) and the term "job
prerequisite" as derived from EEOC regulations interpreting §
12111(8) (as litigated in the Johnson case). Indeed, the terms appear
and, as discussed below, have been used interchangeably by at least
one court21 - to mean the same thing.
On the other hand, the fact that the terms at issue - "individual
with a disability" and "otherwise qualified individual with a
disability" - contain differing language and appear in separatelyenumerated anti-discrimination provisions of the ADA suggest that
accompanying text.
118. 511 F.3d at 994.
119. Johnson v. Bd. of Trs. of Boundary Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 101, 666 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir.
2011); see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5); supra note 95 and accompanying text; see also supra note 22
and accompanying text.
120. Johnson, 666 F.3d at 567.
121. See Bates, 511 F.3d at 990 n.6 (court of appeals, in supporting its conclusion that the
plain language of and legislative history underlying the ADA do not require that an employee
meet job prerequisites in order to be qualified under § 12111(8) and § 1630.2(m), relied on
language of and legislative history underlying job selection criteria provision in § 12112(b)(6));
see also infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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Congress intended, at the very least, that the terms have different
meanings and, as such, impose different legal requirements.1 22 Also,
although the term "individual with a disability" is clear and
unambiguous in that it speaks only to an individual suffering from a
medical condition under the ADA and contains no language about
the individual's qualifications for a job, the term "otherwise qualified
individual with a disability" is ambiguous in that it is susceptible to
more than one reasonable interpretation. In this regard, the term
could reasonably mean an individual with a disability who can meet
all job prerequisites (and perform the essential functions of the
position), except for those prerequisites (or essential functions) which
his or her disability prevents him or her from satisfying or performing,
but which he or she could satisfy with a reasonable accommodation
(as argued by Johnson and the EEOC in Johnson)."' Alternatively,
the term could reasonably mean an individual who satisfies all job
prerequisites without the need for a reasonable accommodation (as
argued by the School District in Johnson).124 The fact that neither the
district court nor the Ninth Circuit in Johnson attempted to parse the
ADA's relevant language concerning "qualified individual" and,
instead, focused on the meaning of rules promulgated by the EEOC1 25
and the fact that both parties to the Johnson appeal, as well as amicus
curiae EEOC, filed briefs arguing that the plain language of the ADA
(and the EEOC regulations) supported their respective positions
further suggests the ambiguity in the statute. 26
In sum, evaluating the ADA's relevant provisions as a whole,
and although there may be good, text-related reasons to require
employers to make reasonable accommodations in both job selection
122. Johnson, 666 F.3d at 567 (noting "analytical[] ... distinct[ion]" between reasonable
accommodation claim and disparate treatment and disparate impact claims under the ADA);
see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004) (Congress's use of "certain
language in one part of the statute and different language in another" can indicate that
"different meanings were intended").
123. See Opening Brief, supra note 91, at 22; Brief for the United States and Equal
Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant and Arguing for
Reversal, at 17, Johnson, 666 F.3d 561 (July 28, 2010), availableat 2010 WL 5162539.
124. See Answering Brief of Defendants/Appellees, at 8, 11, Johnson, 666 F.3d 561 (Sept. 3,
2010), availableat 2010 WL 5162540.
125. Johnson v. Bd. of Trs. of Boundary Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 101, No. CV-09-61-N-BLW,
2010 WL 530070 at *8 (D. Idaho Feb. 9, 2010), affd, 666 F.3d 561 (9th Cir. 2011).
126. See Opening Brief, supra note 91, at 10-11, 18, 23, 26; and Brief for the United States
and EEOC, supra note 123, at 11, 16; Answering Brief, supra note 124, at 11; see also Marcoux
v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 881 A.2d 1138, 1142 (Me. 2005) (where opposing
parties argued that their respective positions were each supported by the plain language of the
statute, court found ambiguity in statutory language); Clark County v. S. Nev. Health Dist., 289
P.3d 212, 215-16 (Nev. 2012) (same).
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criteria cases under § 12112(b)(6) and job prerequisite cases under §
12112(b)(5), the inclusion of the term "otherwise qualified" in §
12112(b)(5) creates sufficient ambiguity in the statutory language to
preclude a plain language determination that an employer's duty to
provide a reasonable accommodation in a job prerequisites case. In
other words, the language of the ADA alone does not resolve the
question raised in Johnson, i.e. whether an employer is required
under the ADA to provide a reasonable accommodation to an
applicant or employee with a disability in order to allow that
individual to satisfy job prerequisites for a position or only to perform
the essential functions of a position. Thus, we must look further.
B. Legislative History and Statutory Precursor
Both the ADA's plain language and its legislative history, as well
as judicial interpretations of the ADA's statutory predecessor, section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, clearly indicate that Congress intended
that employers have a duty to reasonably accommodate employees or
applicants concerning performing essential job functions and
satisfying qualification standards/job selection criteria. Less clear,
however, is what that legislative history means concerning employer
provision of reasonable accommodation concerning employee
satisfaction of job prerequisites.
The House and Senate reports accompanying the ADA make
clear that "[t]he underlying premise of [Title I's employment
provisions] is that persons with disabilities should not be excluded
from job opportunities unless they are actually unable to do the
job."'27 Specifically, concerning the qualification standards/job
selection criteria provisions of § 12112(b)(6), the House and Senate
reports refer to the public law sections corresponding to § 12112(b)(6)
and the reasonable accommodation provisions of § 12112(b)(5) and
provide that "[i]n order to assure a match between job criteria and an
applicant's actual ability to do the job, the bill contains ... the
requirement that any selection criteria that screen out or tend to
127.

H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 31-32 (1990). The relevant language in the Senate

report is essentially identical to the above-quoted language in the House report. See S. REP. No.
101-116, at 37-38 (1989). The Supreme Court has made clear that, if congressional intent cannot
be gleaned from the plain language of a statute, House and Senate committee reports are the

next best source. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) ("In surveying legislative
history we have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's

intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which 'represen[t] the considered and collective
understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation."'

(quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969))).
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screen out people with disabilities be job-related and consistent with
business necessity [§ 102(b)(6)]; and . .. the requirement to provide
reasonable accommodation to assist persons with disabilities to meet
legitimate job criteria [§ 102(b) (5)]."12' The House report further
provides as follows:
If a person with a disability applies for a job and meets all selection
criteria except one that he or she cannot meet because of a
disability, the criterion must concern an essential, and not marginal,
aspect of the job. The criterion must be carefully tailored to
measure the actual ability of a person to perform an essential
function of the job. If the criterion meets this test, it is not
discriminatory on its face and is not prohibited by the ADA. If the
legitimate criterion can be satisfied by the applicant with a reasonable
accommodation, then the reasonable accommodation must be
provided under Section 102(b) (5). 129
Referring again to the reasonable accommodation provisions in §
102(b)(5), the term "otherwise qualified" and to "job-related
selection criteria/qualification standards" under § 102(b)(6), the
House report continues:
...

the legislation requires that reasonable accommodation be

made for "an otherwise qualified individual who is an applicant or
employee... " The term "otherwise qualified" is used in this
particular provision in order to clearly describe a person with a
disability who meets all of an employer's job-related selection
criteria except those criteria that he or she cannot meet because of
a disability, but which could be met with a reasonable
accommodation.... This individual, who is "otherwise qualified"
for the job, must then be offered the reasonable accommodation
that will then make the individual a "qualified individual with a
disability" under this title.
For example, if a law firm requires that all incoming lawyers have
graduated from an accredited law school and have passed the bar
examination, the law firm need not provide an accommodation to
an individual with a visual impairment who has not yet met these
selection criteria. That individual is not yet eligible for a reasonable
accommodation because he or she is not otherwise qualified for the
position.130

Similarly, the Senate report states regarding those three ADA
terms as follows:
Section 102(b)(5) of the legislation requires that reasonable
128. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 31-32 (emphasis added); S. REP. No. 101-116, at
37-38 (emphasis added).
129. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 31-32 (emphasis added).
130. H. R. REP. No. 101-485, at 64-65. Again, the relevant text in the Senate report is nearly
identical. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 33-34; see also discussion supra note 127 and
accompanying text.

2014]

JOB PREREQUISITES AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION

63

accommodation be made for "a qualified individual who is an
applicant or employee ***" The term "qualified" as used in this
section does not refer to the definition of "qualified individual with
a disability" set forth in section 101(7) because such an
interpretation would be circular and meaningless. Rather, as in
section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] regulations, the term
"qualified" in section 102(b)(5) means "otherwise qualified" (See
CFR 84.12(a)), i.e., a person with a disability who meets all of an
employer's job-related selection criteria except such criteria he or
she cannot meet because of a disability.131
The House report, referencing qualification standards/job
selection criteria under the section 102(b)(6) and section 504 case law
and regulations, further provides that
[i]f an employer uses a facially neutral qualification standard,
employment test or other selection criterion that has a
discriminatory effect on persons with disabilities, this practice
would be discriminatory unless the employer can demonstrate that
it is job related and required by business necessity.3 2
The requirement that job selection procedures be job-related
and consistent with business necessity underscores the need to
examine all selection criteria to assure that they not only provide an
accurate measure of an applicant's actual ability to perform the job,
but that even if they do provide such a measure, a disabled
applicant is offered a reasonable accommodation to meet the
criteria that relate to the essential functions of the job at issue.
32 See, Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Service,
662 F.2d 292, 306 (5th Cir.,
1981), 45 CFR 84.13; 28 CFR 42.512; 29 CFR 32.14; 42 Fed.Reg.

22688, ¶ 17 (1977).132
In Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Service,33 plaintiff, an individual with a
physical handicap brought a case under section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act against a federal government agency, claiming
"that, despite his handicap, he [was] physically able to perform the
job for which he applied, but that the postal service's physical
requirements, neutral on their face, had disparate impact upon a
person with his particular handicap and that they excluded him from
employment that in fact he was physically able to perform."1 34 The
Fifth Circuit, discussing the requirements of both section 501 and the
ADA's statutory predecessor, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
first noted that handicapped persons face four distinct types of
discriminatory barriers when seeking employment: (1) intentional

131.
132.
133.
134.

S. REP. No. 101-116, at 31.
H. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 42.
662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.1981).
Id. at 304.
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discrimination for reasons of social bias; (2) neutral standards with
disparate impact; (3) surmountable impairment barriers; and (4)
insurmountable impairment barriers."' The court of appeals next
noted that "the Supreme Court held that the Rehabilitation Act does
not require redress of 'insurmountable barrier' handicap
discrimination [in] that the statutory language prohibiting
discrimination against an 'otherwise qualified handicapped individual'
means qualified 'in spite' of his handicap, not qualified in all respects
except for being handicapped." 1 6 However, turning to what the court
characterized as Prewitt's "surmountable barrier" claim, the court
found and concluded that Prewitt had raised genuine issues of
material fact on his challenge to the postal service's job
requirements.' 37 Specifically, the court of appeals held that, in order
for a plaintiff to prove a prima facie case, he must show "that he is
qualified for the position under all but the challenged criteria."'3 8 The
court further held that Prewitt had raised genuine issues of material
fact concerning his reasonable accommodation claim as well.3 9
Clearly, the ADA's legislative history, including its reference to
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and case law interpreting it,
make clear (as did the ADA's plain language) that an employer has a
duty to reasonably accommodate an employee or applicant who
needs assistance in performing the essential functions of a job and
who can satisfy all job-related selection criteria, except for the criteria
he or she cannot satisfy because of his or her disability. But does that
requirement also lead to the conclusion that Congress intended to
require an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee or
applicant who satisfies all job prerequisites, except for a job
prerequisite that the individual cannot meet because of a disability?
Certainly, Congress's general exhortation that "persons with
disabilities should not be excluded from job opportunities unless they
are actually unable to do the job" suggests that Congress intended
employers to reasonably accommodate employees or applicants who
can do the job, when the accommodation would plausibly remedy a
3

135. Id. at 305 n.19 (citing Mark E. Martin, Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: The
Meaning of DiscriminationUnder Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 881,
883-84 (1980) and Amy Jo Gittler, Fair Employment and the Handicapped:A Legal Perspective,
27 DEPAUL L. REv. 953, 958-66 (1978)).
136. Id. at 307 (citing Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979)).
137. 662 F.2d at 309.
138. Id. at 306.
139. Id. at 309-10 & n.23.
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disability-caused inability pertaining to any important aspect of job
qualifications or performance - whether it be essential functions,
qualification standards/job selection criteria or job prerequisites. Just
as courts have blurred any distinction between "qualification
standards/job selection criteria" and "job prerequisites," 40 courts
have also treated "job prerequisites" as if they were "essential
functions" of a job.41 Moreover, a strong argument can be made that,
given the similarity between the terms "qualification standards/job
selection criteria" or "legitimate (job) criterion" and "job
prerequisites," the terms should carry the same meaning and impose
the same reasonable accommodation requirement under the ADA.1 42
Indeed, the term "legitimate (job) criteria," when contrasted with
qualification standards or job selection criteria that screen out or tend
to screen out otherwise qualified individuals, seems particularly
synonymous with job prerequisites. However, Congress used only the
terms "qualification standards/job selection criteria," "legitimate
criterion," "otherwise qualified," and "essential function" in the
ADA and the House and Senate reports accompanying the statute. In
contrast, the term "job prerequisites," although relating to the ADA's
"otherwise qualified" requirement, is an EEOC construct and came
from the agency only after the enactment of the ADA. Thus,
140.

See Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 990 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007), discussed

supra note 121 and accompanying text.

141.

See Coleman v. Pa. State Police, No. 11-1457, 2013 WL 3776928, at *14 (W.D. Pa. July

17, 2013) (both quoting and characterizing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Johnson v. Board of
Trustees of Boundary County School DistrictNo. 101, 666 F.3d 561 (9th Cir, 2011), district court
stated that "'Johnson's lack of legal authorization to teach in Idaho rendered her unqualified
pursuant to the first step of the two-step qualification inquiry and the employer is not obligated
to furnish any reasonable accommodation that would enable her to perform the essential job

functions"'); Johnson v. Bd. of Trs. of Boundary Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 101, No. CV-09-61-NBLW, 2010 WL 530070, at *9 (D. Idaho Feb. 9, 2010) (according to district court, "when
Johnson's teaching certificate expired she could no longer perform the 'essential functions' of

the position because she was precluded by State law from doing so") (citing Levinger v. Mercy
Med. Ctr., Nampa, 75 P.3d 1202, 1208 (2003) ("When Levinger's medical privileges and medical
license were suspended, he was no longer capable of performing the essential functions of his
job.")); see also McDonald v. Menino, No. 96-10825-RGS, 1997 WL 106955, at *3 (D. Mass. Jan.
3, 1997) (residency requirement, which looks very much like a "job selection criteria" or "job
prerequisite," treated as an "essential function" of public sector job); but cf Valle v. City of
Chicago, 982 F.Supp. 560, 566 (N.D. Ill 1997)(noting the difference between "threshold
qualification tests" and essential functions and stating that "[t]hreshold requirements ...

once

they are satisfied ... no longer need to be performed by the employee").
142. Although the issue here involves the meaning of similar language in the ADA and
EEOC rules and guidances, Judge O'Scannlain, who authored the majority opinion in Johnson,
has stated in analogous circumstances that "'[w]e generally adhere to the maxim of statutory
construction that similar terms appearing in different sections of a statute should receive the

same interpretation."' Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 615 F.3d 1217, 1230 (9th Cir. 2010)
(quoting United States v. Nordbrock, 38 F.3d 440, 444 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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although a strong argument can be made that the nearly-identical
terms "qualification standards/job selection criteria" and "job
prerequisites" should receive the same interpretation vis-h-vis the
reasonable accommodation issue, it cannot be said - indeed, it would
strain credulity and logic to say - that Congress, which never used the
term "job prerequisites" in either the ADA or committee reports,
intended to attach legal requirements, let alone a particular legal
requirement, to the term.
Lastly, the law firm example used by Congress, although at first
glance militating against an employer having a duty to reasonably
accommodate an employee or applicant with a disability who cannot
satisfy a job prerequisite, does not illustrate the precise issue
addressed by this article (and by the courts in Johnson). In this
regard, the example describes circumstances where the lawyer's
disability - visual impairment - did not cause the lawyer's inability to

satisfy the firm's job prerequisite of having all of its attorneys
graduate from accredited law schools and pass the bar examination.
Rather, the lawyer's inability to satisfy the firm's job prerequisites
presumably had nothing to do with her disability and had everything
to do with an insufficient undergraduate grade point average, low
LSAT score, and below passing score on the bar exam. As such, the
law firm example is more akin to an "insurmountable barrier"
disability described in Prewitt and Davis, which causes an individual
with a disability to not be otherwise qualified and for which a
reasonable accommodation is not required. Specifically, the example
roughly illustrates an "insurmountable barrier" case in that it
describes an individual who cannot satisfy the job prerequisite and
happens to be disabled, rather than the kind of "surmountable
barrier" disability case described in Johnson, where the individual
could have satisfied the job prerequisite "in spite of" her disability if
the employer had provided a reasonable accommodation.'4 3
143. The law firm example is akin to, but not precisely the same as, an insurmountable
barrier case. In this regard, one district court has described an insurmountable barrier case as
occurring "where the handicap itself prevents the individual from fulfilling the essential
requirements of the position." Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 378 (E.D. Pa. 1983),
affd, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984). As alluded to above, there is no indication in the law firm
example that the lawyer's visual impairment had anything to do with his inability to meet the
firm's job prerequisites. However, the Seventh Circuit, citing the above-discussed Williams v.
United Insurance Co. of America, 253 F.3d 280 (7th Cir.2001) case, has concluded that a disabled
employee's inability to satisfy a job prerequisite need not necessarily have been caused by a
disability to take the employee outside ADA coverage, stating that "the ADA does not shelter
disabled individuals from adverse employment actions if the individual, for reasons unrelated to
his disability . . is not qualified for the job or is unable to perform the job's essential functions or
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For these reasons, the legislative history underlying the ADA
(like its plain meaning) provides some degree of support for the
proposition that employers have a duty to reasonably accommodate
an employee or applicant who can meet all job prerequisites other
than the one(s) he or she cannot meet because of a disability, but
does not definitively resolve the question.
C. EEOC Authority
Because the ADA's plain language and legislative history are
on the job prerequisite/reasonable
less than conclusive
accommodation issue, we must turn next to the EEOC's several
pronouncements concerning the matter.*
1. Pre- (and Post-) Johnson Rules and Guidance
Well prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Johnson and
continuing to this day, the EEOC promulgated both rules and
administrative guidances concerning the job prerequisites and
reasonable accommodation issue. As discussed above, the EEOC
added the job prerequisites inquiry to the essential function analysis
under § 12111(8) by promulgating § 1630.2(m), which defines
"qualified individual with a disability" as someone who "satisfies the
requisite skills, experience, education and other job-related
requirements of the employment position such individual holds or
desires and [who], with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of such position." 145 The EEOC went
on to explain in its interpretative guidance concerning § 1630.2(m)
that the first step in this administratively-coined analysis
is to determine if the individual satisfies the prerequisites for the
position, such as possessing the appropriate educational
background, employment experience, skills, licenses, etc. For
example, the first step in determining whether an accountant who is
paraplegic is qualified for a certified public accountant (CPA)
fulfill the requirements of the position as prescribed by the employer." Hammel v. Eau Galle
Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 862 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Williams, 253 F.3d at 282).
144. See Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 185 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("Ordinarily, we ascertain the meaning of a statutory provision by looking to its text,
and, if the statutory language is unclear, to its legislative history. Where these barometers offer
ambiguous guidance as to Congress' intent, we defer to the interpretations of the provision
articulated by the agencies responsible for its enforcement, so long as these agency
interpretations are 'based on a permissible construction of the statute."' (quoting Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984))).
145. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.

68

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:35

position is to examine the individual's credentials to determine
whether the individual is a licensed CPA. 14 6

And, concerning an employer's obligation to reasonably
accommodate an individual with a disability who could satisfy job
prerequisites with such an accommodation, the EEOC further stated
in its interpretative guidance:
The obligation to make reasonable accommodation is a form
of non-discrimination. It applies to all employment decisions and to
the job application process....
The reasonable accommodation requirement is best
understood as a means by which barriers to the equal employment
opportunity of an individual with a disability are removed or
alleviated....
The term "otherwise qualified" is intended to make clear that
the obligation to make reasonable accommodation is owed only to
an individual with a disability who is qualified within the meaning
of § 1630.2(m) in that he or she satisfies all the skill, experience,
education and other job-related selection criteria. An individual
with a disability is "otherwise qualified," in other words, if he or she
is qualified for a job, except that, because of the disability, he or she
needs a reasonable accommodation to be able to perform the job's
essential functions.1 47
But, the EEOC continued in its enforcement guidance as follows:
There is no obligation for the employer to assist the individual
to become qualified. Thus, the employer does not have to provide
training so that the employee acquires necessary skills to take a job.
The employer, however, would have to provide an employee with a
disability who is being reassigned with any training that is normally
provided to anyone hired for or transferred to the position.

And, addressing the related issue of job selection criteria and
reasonable accommodation, the EEOC tracked the House and
Senate reports by stating in its interpretative guidance that
[t]he purpose of this provision is to ensure that individuals with
disabilities are not excluded from job opportunities unless they are
actually unable to do the job....
... [S]election criteria that are related to an essential function of
the job may not be used to exclude an individual with a disability if
that individual could satisfy the criteria with the provision of a
146.
147.

29 C. F. R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(m) (2013).
29 C. F. R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9.

148. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE No. 915.002,
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT 20 (2002).
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reasonable accommodation. Experience under a similar provision
implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act indicates that
challenges to selection criteria are, in fact, most often resolved by
reasonable accommodation. It is therefore anticipated that
challenges to selection criteria brought under this part will
generally be resolved in a like manner.14

Much like the ADA's plain language, the EEOC regulation
creating the two-step process concerning the ADA's otherwise
qualified standard is ambiguous in that it is reasonably subject to
more than one interpretation. Indeed, the majority in Johnson drew
inferences and presumed that the EEOC's omission of a specific
reasonable accommodation requirement concerning an individual's
ability to satisfy job prerequisites militated in favor of an
interpretation that the duty-to-provide-a-reasonable-accommodation
issue would only arise concerning an individual with a disability's
ability to perform the essential functions of a position;so however,

Judge Paez, concurring and dissenting, believed that the majority's
inferences and presumptions, while reasonable "in a vacuum," were
not conclusive and were rebutted by the EEOC's explanation of its
position in its amicus brief.'

Similarly, the EEOC's guidances, like the ADA's legislative
history, generally exhort employers to accommodate individuals with
disabilities. At various junctures, the guidances state that "[t]he
determination of whether an individual with a disability is
qualified ... should be based on the capabilities of the individual ...
at the time of the employment decision,"" 2 "[t]he reasonable
accommodation requirement is best understood as a means by which
barriers to the equal employment opportunity of an individual with a
disability are removed or alleviated,"1 53 and "[t]he purpose of this
provision is to ensure that individuals with disabilities are not
excluded from job opportunities unless they are actually unable to do
the job."15 4 Moreover, the EEOC's interpretative guidance, like the
ADA's legislative history, blurs distinctions in terms. Thus, in the
above-quoted
two-sentence
paragraph
discussing reasonable
accommodations, the EEOC states that the term "otherwise

149.
150.
2011).
151.
152.
153.
154.

29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.10.
Johnson v. Bd. of Trs. of Boundary Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 101, 666 F.3d 561,565 (9th Cir.
Id. at 570 (Paez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(m).
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9; see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.10.
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qualified" is used to make clear that an employer only has a duty to
reasonably accommodate an individual with a disability under
1630.2(m)'s job prerequisites provision if the individual can satisfy,
among other things, the employer's "job-relatedselection criteria," but
that "[a]n individual with a disability [will be] . .. 'otherwise
qualified' . . . if he or she is qualified for a job, except that, because of
the disability, he or she needs a reasonable accommodation to
perform the job's essential functions.""m And, the EEOC's use of the
House and Senate report's law firm example, as well as the example
of a paraplegic accountant who will only be qualified for an
accountant position if he or she possesses a CPA license (again)
describe cases where the employee or applicant is not otherwise
qualified for the position that he or she holds or seeks and, as a result,
is not entitled to a reasonable accommodation from the employer.
Specifically, the examples constitute "insurmountable barrier" cases
(or cases akin thereto) where the employer has no duty to reasonably
accommodate individuals with disabilities because the reasons for the
employees' or applicants' inability to satisfy job prerequisites are
either the severity of the disabling condition or unrelated to the
individuals' disabilities such that an accommodation would not enable
them to satisfy job prerequisites. These circumstances are in marked
contrast to "surmountable barrier" cases where, as in Johnson,
reasonable accommodations would, as discussed below, allow the
individuals to satisfy job prerequisites "in spite of" their disability.
Likewise, the EEOC does not specify whether its bald statements that
"[t]here is no obligation for the employer to assist the individual to
become qualified" and that "the employer does not have to provide
training so that the employee acquires necessary skills to take a job"
applies only to an "insurmountable barrier"/"insurmountable
barrier"-like case or to a "surmountable barrier" case as well. Thus,
the EEOC's examples are again inconclusive on the job
prerequisites/reasonable accommodation issue.
Lastly, the EEOC's guidances - again, like the ADA's legislative
history - by discussing the reasonable accommodation requirement in
the context of job selection criteria and essential functions of a job,
send out mixed or arguably negative signals concerning whether
employers owe a duty to reasonably accommodate individuals whose
disabilities prevent them from satisfying job prerequisites.
For all of these reasons, the EEOC rules and guidances - like the
155.

See supra note 147 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
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ADA's plain language and legislative history - provide less-than-clear
authority concerning the job prerequisite/reasonable accommodation
issue resolved against the plaintiff in Johnson both at trial court
proceedings and on appeal.
2. The EEOC's Position in its Amicus Brief in Johnson
In contrast to the lack of clarity concerning the job
prerequisites/reasonable accommodation issue, the EEOC's amicus
curiae brief on Johnson's appeal to the Ninth Circuit removed all
doubt about the EEOC's position (or at least the position of its
attorneys) on the issue.
In its brief, the EEOC, equating qualification standards/job
selection criteria described under H§ 12112(b)(6) and 12113(a) with
job prerequisites under § 1630.2(m), made clear that it believes that
an individual with a disability is qualified under the ADA - and
would, therefore, be entitled to a reasonable accommodation from an
employer - where the accommodation would enable the individual to
satisfy job prerequisites or perform an essential function of the job
which the individual holds or seeks.' The EEOC's brief was replete
with unequivocal statements concerning its position on the job
prerequisites/reasonable accommodation issue:
The district court erred in failing to ask the controlling
question: whether plaintiff would have been a "qualified
individual" under the ADA if she had received the one-year waiver
of the certification requirement from the [SBE]. Its failure to do so
was in turn based upon its erroneous view that the reasonable
accommodation requirement in Title I of the ADA does not apply
to job qualification standards....
Title I's plain language establishes that an employer must
reasonably accommodate an employee or applicant with a
disability, where such an accommodation is available to enable that
individual to (1) perform an essential function of the job in
question, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), 12111(8); or (2) satisfy the Job's
qualification standards or selection criteria, 42 U.S.C. 12113(a).
[and]
The court read the EEOC's Intepretive Guidance to mean that an
employer's obligation of reasonable accommodation does not apply
to job prerequisites, such as a teaching license. Thus, according to
the district court's rationale, an individual whose disability prevents
156. Brief for the United States and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, supra
note 123, at 10-11, 14-17, 18 (not explicitly mentioning 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. II 2008)
but discussing language found there as well as in § 12113(a)).
157. Id. at 10-11; see also id. at 16.
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him or her form obtaining a State-mandated license is never
entitled to a reasonable accommodation because the individual is
not "qualified." This reading of the ADA, and of the EEOC's
Interpretative Guidance, was erroneous.

[and]
The district court's decision, however, was not faithful to the
language of the statute. By erroneously concluding that the duty to
reasonably accommodate is inapplicable to job qualification
standards, the court failed to conduct the inquiry mandated by the
statute; i.e., whether plaintiff would have been "qualified" for the
job if she received the waiver she requested.159

Thus, the EEOC, in its amicus brief in Johnson, but not in its
rules and guidances, has definitively taken the position that an
employer's duty of reasonable accommodation extends to both

assisting an individual in performing essential job functions and in
satisfying job prerequisites. As pointed out by concurring and
dissenting Judge Paez in Johnson, the EEOC's position, because it
was not inconsistent with the ADA and its own regulations or clearly
erroneous, should have been followed by the Ninth Circuit. However,
as discussed previously, that was not to be.160
158. Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
159. Id. at 16-17.
160. As alluded to previously, qualified individuals with disabilities possess alternatives to
remedy disability discrimination under the ADA. Thus, as discussed in McDonald v. Menino,
No. 96-10825-RGS, 1997 WL 106955 (D. Mass. Jan. 3, 1997) and Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Service,
662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.1981), an ADA plaintiff may pursue a disparate impact claim under the
ADA. See supra notes 28-35, 133-39 and accompanying text. Based on § 12112(b)(6)'s
prohibition on the use of "qualification standards... or other selection criteria that screen out
or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities
unless the standard ... or other selection criteria . . . is shown to be job-related ... and ...
consistent with business necessity," the Supreme Court has confirmed that disparate impact
claims are cognizable under the ADA. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003).
Under this theory, if a discriminatory qualification standard or selection criterion is not jobrelated and consistent with business necessity, it will not be enforceable under the ADA. See,
e.g., Cripe v. City of San Jose, 261 F.3d 877, 890-93, 895 (9th Cir. 2001) (municipal policy
restricting disabled police officers to undesirable assignments); Gaus v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No.
09-1698, 2011 WL 4527359, at **30-31 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2011) (railway's medical guidelines
barring employees using certain medications from working). As such, an individual with a
disability who is able to satisfy all job prerequisites (and perform all essential functions) of a
position other than the discriminatory prerequisite/criterion/ standard will be qualified for the
position and would not need to seek a reasonable accommodation to satisfy the discriminatory
standard. Bates v. United Parcel Serv., 511 F.3d 974, 990 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2007), discussed supra
note 54 and accompanying text.
Unlike the theory espoused in this article, a discriminatory impact theory allows an
ADA plaintiff to challenge the legitimacy of the job prerequisite itself. For this reason and
others, commentators have suggested that the disparate impact theory has been underutilized,
but holds promise as an alternative to reasonable accommodation-based claims, under the
ADA. Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, DisparateImpact, and Class
Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861 (2006). However, a review of the post-Raytheon case law indicates
that lower courts, while recognizing the availability of disparate impact claims under the ADA,
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V. THE PROPOSED STANDARD AND ITS RATIONALE AND
CONSEQUENCES

A. The StandardItself
Based on a proper understanding of the ADA's otherwise
qualified and reasonable accommodation provisions, the standard for
determining whether an individual with a disability is a qualified
individual such that an employer has a duty to reasonably
accommodate the individual if he or she cannot satisfy a job
prerequisite is essentially the standard articulated by the EEOC in its
amicus brief on the Johnson appeal. Thus, the standard should be as
follows:
An individual with a disability is a qualified individual - and the
employer must provide a reasonable accommodation to such

individual - (1) where the individual is unable to meet a job
prerequisite because of his or her disability or, in other words,
where the individual can meet all job prerequisites of the position
that he or she holds or seeks, except for those job prerequisites the
employee cannot satisfy because of that disability, but which he or
she can satisfy with a reasonable accommodation and (2) where the

individual can perform the essential function of the position with or
without a reasonable accommodation. 16
have generally not been receptive to such claims as a matter of proof - particularly where
evidence of discriminatory impact on individuals with disabilities is lacking, Kintz v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1253-54 (M. D. Ala. 2011); Adams v. Penn., No. 1:06CV-2154, 2009 WL 2707601, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2009), or the business necessity defense
has been raised by the employer. Allmond v. Akal Sec., Inc., 558 F.3d 1312, 1316-18 (11th Cir.
2009). That said, a compilation of the success or failure rate of ADA disparate impact cases and
the reasons for the results is beyond the scope of this article.
161. An issue may arise concerning whether this standard should apply irrespective of
whether the job prerequisite is solely mandated by the employer or mandated by both the
employer and state or federal law. Certainly, there is no question that the ADA permits an
employer to utilize federal or state statutory or regulatory standards as job prerequisites or
qualification standards for a position. See Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
Thus, although the job prerequisites in Williams v. United Insurance Co. of America, 253 F.3d
280 (7th Cir.2001) were solely employer-imposed, the job prerequisites and/or qualifications
standards in McDonald, Bates, and Johnson stemmed from municipal, federal, and state
regulatory schemes, respectively. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Albertson's, in holding that the
employer could rely on Department of Transportation regulations in determining the employee
qualification issue, pointed to (but did not rely upon) an EEOC regulation which provides a
defense when the employer's hiring or firing decision is "required or necessitated by another

Federal law or regulation, or that another Federal law or regulation prohibits an action
(including the provision of a particular reasonable accommodation) that would otherwise be
required by" the ADA. 527 U.S. at 570 n.16 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e) (1998)). Certainly,
there may be a few instances where, because the job prerequisite or qualification standard is a
state- or federally-imposed requirement admitting to no waiver or exception, the question of
whether an individual with a disability is qualified for a position will rise or fall on the
requirements of the state or federal statute, see, e.g., Brockmeier v. Greater Dayton Regional
Transit Auth., No. 3:12-CV-327, 2013 WL 3337403, *3 (S.D. Ohio July 2, 2013), rejected by No.
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B. The Rationalefor the ProposedStandard
1. Positive Effects of the Proposed Standard
As discussed above, Congress, both in the findings and purposes
provisions concerning the ADA generally and its specific provisions
concerning qualified individuals and reasonable accommodation, has
made clear that the ADA should be read and enforced to enable
individuals with disabilities to work in positions that they hold or seek
unless they are actually unable to do the job. 162 In this regard,
Congress did not draw any fine distinction between job prerequisites
and essential functions of a job and certainly did not draw the even
finer distinction between job prerequisites and qualification
standards/job selection criteria drawn by the Ninth Circuit in the
Johnson case. Indeed, there is good reason why any distinctions
between these various terms have largely (and appropriately) been
blurred by most courts. 163 For an individual with a disability who
3:12-CV-327, 2013 WL 4647139 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 29, 2013), as long as such requirements are
"job-related .. . and . . consistent with business necessity." Gaspar v. DS Waters of Am., No. 11
C 7465, 2013 WL 2355994, at **5-6 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (Supp.
II 2008)). However, in the vast majority of cases, i.e. cases where the job prerequisite or
qualification standard is (a) created by the employer and, therefore, waivable or (b) waivable
even though created by state or federal law, the issue should be addressed under the reasonable
accommodation provisions of the ADA. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 20, 24-27 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 121, 141 and accompanying text. Thus, in McDonald, the district court
analyzed a facially-neutral job requirement - residency - as a discriminatory qualification
standard/job selection criteria under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. II 2008) and held that the
employer had an obligation to reasonably accommodate two individuals with disabilities. See
supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text. Neither the district court nor the majority and
concurrence and dissent in Johnson v. Board of Trustees of Boundary County School District
No. 101, 666 F.3d 561 (9th Cir. 2011) cited or discussed McDonald.
Initially, the district court in Johnson characterized another facially-neutral job
prerequisite - professional licensing - as a qualification standard. See supra text accompanying
note 70. However, ignoring the distinctions made in Bates, the district court ultimately
characterized professional licensing as an essential function of Johnson's teaching position,
thereby improperly conflating a qualification standard or a job prerequisite with an essential
function, but holding that the school district had no obligation to reasonably accommodate
Johnson. Id. A causal factor in that conflation was the district court's decision to distinguish
Bates, based on the district court's view that a qualification standard imposed by the state is
legally different from a qualification standard imposed by an employer. Id. However, the source
of the job prerequisites - whether it be government- or employer-imposed - should not give rise
to a legal distinction under the ADA where it is waivable or may be altered by accommodation.
Unlike the court in McDonald, the majority in Johnson treated another facially-neutral
job prerequisite - professional licensing - as a job prerequisite under 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) and
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (m) (2013) (and not a qualification standard/job selection criteria provision
under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6)) and refused to require reasonable accommodation, see supra
notes 87-98 and accompanying text, while the concurrence and dissent believed, like the court in
McDonald, that § 12112(b)(6) could properly apply to a facially neutral job standard that
screens out individuals with disabilities - particularly when the standard could be waived, i.e.
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would be able to perform the job he or she seeks with a reasonable
accommodation, it matters little or not at all that a disability affects
his or her ability to satisfy a licensing requirement - which may
technically be classified as a job prerequisite - rather than teach a
class or drive a vehicle - which would be classified as essential
functions of a job. In either circumstance, the individual merely seeks
assistance from the employer in overcoming a surmountable barrier
caused by his or her disability. Likewise, for an employer (and other
than the cost of the accommodation), it should be equally
inconsequential that the reasonable accommodation it must afford to
that same individual with a disability will enable the individual to
satisfy licensing requirements or perform the day-to-day duties set
forth in a job description. In either circumstance, the employer would
derive the benefit of the individual's labor with no loss in aggregate
productivity and would satisfy the stated purpose of Congress. And,
society would benefit from treating the individual with a disability as
qualified - and affording the individual a reasonable accommodation
- since, in either circumstance, discrimination in the workplace
against qualified individuals with disabilities will be obviated and
non-productivity relating to those same individuals will be thwarted. 64
Thus, recognizing that individuals with disabilities are qualified
when they are able to satisfy job prerequisites (such as the licensing
requirement in Johnson) with a reasonable accommodation - and
requiring employers to make reasonable accommodations under
those circumstances - would not only benefit such individuals, but
would also be consistent with the purposes of the ADA.
2. Remedial Effects of the Proposed Standard
Several scholars and commentators have recognized the judicial
tendency to act as a "gatekeeper" in ADA cases by resolving cases on
summary judgment in favor of employers on the question of whether
plaintiffs are disabled within the meaning of the ADA and thereby
avoiding the question of whether an employer has a duty to

addressed by a reasonable accommodation. Johnson, 666 F.3d at 571 (Paez, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
164. Johnson herself is a good example. Although Johnson completed all of the course
work necessary to obtain certification within six months of her termination by the school
district, she could not find a teaching position. Reply Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant Trish Johnson,
supra note 111, at 6 n.2. As a result, Johnson deferred obtaining renewal of her teaching
certificate because she could not afford the $ 150 recertification fee. Id.
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reasonably accommodate an employee or applicant.1 65 The district
court and Ninth Circuit in Johnson, although accepting for purposes
of the proceedings before them that Johnson suffered from a
disability cognizable under the ADA, similarly truncated the
disability discrimination analysis - and avoided the reasonable
accommodation issue (except by way of dicta from the district court
and a concurring (and dissenting) opinion from Judge Paez) - by
finding and concluding that Johnson was not qualified under the
ADA.
However, as alluded to above, recognizing a duty in an employer
to reasonably accommodate an individual with a disability when the
accommodation will allow an employee or applicant to perform
essential job functions and satisfy job prerequisites will remedy the
judicial proclivity to avoid reasonable accommodation analysis when
the spirit, if not quite clearly, the letter, of the ADA strongly militates
in favor of a robust application of the Act's reasonable
accommodation provisions.'66 Moreover, as discussed more fully
below, recognition of an employer's duty of reasonable
accommodation under these circumstances would not unduly burden
employers and not improperly shift the balance of power in favor of
employees or applicants under the ADA.' 67
For these reasons, judicial recognition that an individual with a
disability is qualified - and that an employer owes such individual a
165. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act.: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 101, 103, 110-26 (1999); John E. Rumel, Federal Disability
DiscriminationLaw and the Toxic Workplace: A Critique of ADA and Section 504 Case Law
Addressing Impairments Caused or Exacerbatedby the Work Environment, 51 SANTA CLARA L.

REv. 515, 536-42 (2011) (citing Comm'n on Mental & Physical Disability Law, Am. Bar Ass'n,
Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 404-05 (1998)); Michael Ashley Stein, Foreward:

Disability and Identity, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 907, 908 (2003); see also Mary Crossley,
Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the AntidiscriminationProject, 35 RUTGERS
L. J. 861, 864 n.13, 945 n.353 (2004) (citing Matthew Diller, JudicialBacklash, the ADA, and the
Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LABOR L. 19 (2000)). See generally Burgdorf, supra
note 19 (chronicling and decrying the numerous judicial decisions narrowly construing the
ADA's definition of disability).
166. As in cases where courts have summarily determined that an individual is not disabled
within the meaning of the ADA, a "robust" application of the ADA's reasonable
accommodation provisions in job prerequisite cases would mean nothing more (or less) than
giving full play to this important component of the ADA. See Rumel, supra note 165, at 542. For
a discussion of the features of a truly robust reasonable accommodation provision, i.e. one that
would apply a "mixed civil rights/social welfare approach" and go beyond applying the existing
provisions of the ADA by mandating accommodations outside the workplace and government
subsidization of those accommodations, see Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits
of Antidiscrimination,83 WASH. L. REv. 513, 556-58 (2008).
167. See infra notes 169-80 and accompanying text.
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duty of reasonable accommodation - when a reasonable
accommodation will enable the individual to satisfy job prerequisites
- will constitute one more step toward properly curbing the judicial
tendency to give less-than-full effect to each of the ADA's
provisions."
3. The Proposed Standard Would Not Unduly Burden Employers
and Would Strike the Appropriate Balance of Power Between
Individuals with Disabilities and Employers Under the ADA
As discussed above, the proposed standard concerning the job
prerequisite/reasonable accommodation issue would expand the class
of individuals with disabilities who will be entitled to job protection
under the ADA - to the benefit of those individuals, society, and,
perhaps less obviously, employers. But what of its potential burden
on employers?
A number of scholars have demonstrated that, at least prior to
the enactment of the ADAAA in 2008, employers typically prevailed
in suits brought under the ADA, winning approximately 84 percent to
94 percent of cases that were not settled prior to motion practice or,
less likely, trial.169 The 2008 amendments to the ADA, which, among
other things, expanded the definition of disability under the ADA,
should increase the win rates of plaintiffs to some degree; however,
several scholars remain skeptical about plaintiffs' prospects even
under the enhanced protections of the ADAAA17 0 - and for good
reason.
168. See Rumel, supra note 165, at 532-39 (arguing that, because workplace-caused
or -exacerbated impairments may substantially limit major life activities other than working,
they constitute disabilities under, and should be subject to the reasonable accommodation
provisions of, the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
169. See Colker, supra note 165, at 107-08; Louis Rulli, Employment Discrimination
Litigation Under the ADA from the Perspective of the Poor: Can the Promise of Title I be
Fulfilled for Low-Income Workers in the Next Decade?, 9 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REv. 345,
365-366 (2000); see also Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title 1 of the ADA Work?,
59 ALA. L. REv. 305, 308-09 (2008) (citing Colker and Rulli).
170. See, e.g., Stacy A. Hickox, The Underwhelming Impact of the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct Amendment Act, 40 U. BALT. L. REv. 419, 420 (2011) (expressing concerning
that other requirements of the amended Act, including difficulties in proving substantial
limitations on major life activities and addressing temporary or intermittent disabilities and the
need to compare the effect of an impairment on an individual to its effect on the general
population and other plaintiffs and to utilize expert testimony in proving ADA cases, will
continue to stymie plaintiffs); see also Sharona Hoffmann, Employing E-Health: The Impact of
Electronic Health Records on the Workplace, 19 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y, 409, 423 (2010)
(notwithstanding the 2008 amendments, "plaintiffs will still find it challenging to prove that
adverse employment decisions are linked to their disability status and were motivated by
employers' intent to discriminate").
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Under the ADA and the 2008 amendments, plaintiffs have
always faced and continue to face significant barriers to recovery.
Indeed, those barriers are even more fundamental than the not
insignificant barriers discussed by scholars concerning the ADAAA.
To prevail under the Act, a plaintiff must prove he or she suffers from
an impairment that constitutes a disability under the ADA."' In order
to constitute a disability, the impairment must substantially limit (not
merely incidentally limit) a major life activity (not merely a minor
aspect of life).172 Even if a plaintiff can prove he or she is disabled
within the meaning of the ADA, the plaintiff must also prove that he
or she can satisfy job prerequisites and essential job functions, with or
without a reasonable accommodation.7 If a plaintiff is unable to do
so, an employer is not required to afford the plaintiff a reasonable
accommodation. 74 Also, even if the plaintiff is entitled to an
accommodation from an employer, the accommodation need only be
reasonable and need not be the accommodation requested by
plaintiff.1 75 And, even if a plaintiff requests an otherwise reasonable
accommodation, the employer need not provide the accommodation
if do so would cause it an undue hardship.' Given these barriers, and
given the empirical evidence concerning employer win rates discussed
above, it is not surprising that at least one magistrate judge, in issuing
an enhanced attorney's fee award to a prevailing plaintiff in an ADA
case, stated that "ADA cases are notoriously difficult to win."1 77
In addition, even if adoption of the standard proposed in this
article will expand the circumstance where an employer must
reasonably accommodate an employee or applicant, the existing
empirical evidence uniformly demonstrates that the cost of such
accommodations is minimal-to-non-existent.' Indeed, one scholar,
171. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 21.
173. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
174. See generally supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also Walter v. United Airlines, Inc., No.
99-2622, 2000 WL 1587489, at *5 (4th Cir. Oct. 25, 2000) ("[T]he ADA does not require an
employer to provide the specific accommodation requested by the disabled employee, or even
to provide the best accommodation, so long as the accommodation provided to the disabled
employee is reasonable.").
176. See supra note 22.
177. See Baker v. Windsor Republic Doors, 414 F. App'x 764, 770 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted); see also Rulli, supra note 169, at 368 ("[W]hile plaintiffs find all ADA cases difficult to
win, employment ADA cases are by far the most difficult to win.").
178. See Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV.
1213, 1277-1278 (2003); see also Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Employment
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Part I - Workplace Accommodations, 46
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compiling and analyzing a number of studies, determined that the
provision of reasonable accommodation by employers often involved
no financial outlay at all and seldom cost more than $150.179
In sum, adoption of a legal standard that would recognize an
individual with a disability as otherwise qualified under the ADA if
he or she could satisfy job prerequisites with a reasonable
accommodation - and requiring employers to make such
accommodation - would not unduly burden employers. Rather, it
would more properly balance a statutory scheme that, even when
properly interpreted, poses substantial barriers to recovery, and, in
many ways on many issues, has been improperly interpreted by courts
in favor of employers.8
4. The Proposed Standard Applied to the Cases
The parameters and limitations of the proposed standard, i.e.
that an individual with a disability is otherwise qualified - and an
employer will have a duty to reasonably accommodate that individual
- when his or her disability causes the individual to be unable to
satisfy a job prerequisite, but provision of a reasonable
accommodation will allow him or her to do so, can be better
understood by applying the standard to the cases previously discussed
in this article.
In McDonald, because the proposed legal standard treats job
prerequisites and essential functions identically, whether the
residency requirement at issue is treated as an essential function (as
the court did in the case) or as a job prerequisite (which is the more
accurate characterization of the requirement), the result reached by
the court would not change. As a threshold matter, the employees in
the case would be qualified individuals with disabilities. Next, the City
of Boston would have a duty to reasonably accommodate the
employees. And both because the employees could satisfy job
DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 902 (1997); Rumel, supra note 165, at 542 & n.104; Michael Ashley Stein,
EmpiricalImplications of Title 1, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1671, 1674 (2000).
179. Stein, supra note 178, at 1674.
180. Sometimes improper judicial interpretation of the ADA has occurred despite the fact
that the interpretation has had essentially no support in the text of ADA, its legislative history,
or Supreme Court precedent. See Rumel, supra note 165, at 532-33 (discussing lack of support
for line of cases holding that, when an impairment is caused or exacerbated by the work
environment and substantially limits major life activities other than working, courts must still
treat case as a "working" claim and apply employer-favoring "class-based" or "foreclosure"
analysis). Here, in contrast, the district court's and Ninth Circuit's decisions in Johnson can be
more properly attributed to lack of clarity on the job prerequisites/reasonable accommodation
issue in the ADA's statutory and regulatory scheme and in its legislative history.
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prerequisites and perform the essential functions of their municipal
jobs if the city provided them with a reasonable accommodation and
because the city had applied the residency requirement in a
discriminatory fashion in that it had not enforced and/or waived the
residency requirement for other municipal employees, the city would
almost certainly have been required to waive the residency
requirement for the two employees or other similarly-situated
individuals. Thus, McDonald illustrates why there should not be any
legally-significant difference between job prerequisites and essential
job functions vis-A-vis the duty of reasonable accommodation. It
further illustrates why a facially neutral job prerequisite or
qualification standard/job selection criteria may still give rise to a
duty on behalf of an employer to reasonably accommodate applicants
or employees with disabilities.
In Williams, application of the proposed standard would not
change the result in the case - and specifically, the employer would
not be required to train the employee for the sales manager position
she had sought - for at least two reasons. First, Williams was not a
surmountable barrier case. In this regard, unlike Johnson, but very
much like the law firm and paraplegic examples discussed in the
several ADA authorities, there is no indication in Williams that the
plaintiff's inability to perform the sales manager job that she sought
was caused by her disability or, stated another way, that Williams
could perform the job that she sought despite her disability if only she
received an accommodation in the form of job retraining. Indeed, the
facts in Williams indicate that the plaintiff, because of her disability
stemming from a series of leg injuries, prevented her from working at
the door-to-door salesperson position from which she had been fired,
but had nothing to do with her inability to perform the sales manager
position that she sought. As such, because an accommodation would
not have remedied a disability-caused inability to work in the
salesperson position, Williams was not an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability under either the proposed standard or the
ADA generally.
Second, job training, although an accommodation, will typically
not be a reasonable accommodation under the ADA."' Thus, even in
a surmountable barrier case, i.e. even where a disability causes an
employee to be unable to perform in a new position, and even where
the job training might enable the person to satisfy job prerequisites or
181.

See supra note 39.
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perform essential functions of the job, it will seldom be reasonable
and, indeed, may constitute an undue hardship on an employer - to
require the employer to train or retrain an individual with a
disability.ms As alluded to in Williams (and in the EEOC's
enforcement guidance), one possible exception to this categorical rule
of unreasonableness would occur where the employer offers training
to other, non-disabled employees, but refuses to do so for individuals
with disabilities where the training would enable those latter
individuals to serve in the position for which the training was
designed to qualify applicants."'
Little need be said about Bates. The result in Bates, where the
court of appeals held that, based on both the plain language of the
ADA and on its legislative history, an individual with a disability is
not required to meet an employer's qualification standards/job
selection criteria in order to be qualified under the ADA, would
likewise not change under the proposed standard. In Bates, the
hearing-impaired employees were able to meet all job prerequisites
or qualification standards for the package-car driver position
(seniority, minimum age, and possession of a valid driver's license)
and therefore did not need a reasonable accommodation from the
UPS on those "first-step" issues and only might have needed a
reasonable accommodation on the "second step" essential function
issue concerning safe driving. An employer's duty to reasonably
accommodate an individual with a disability under those later
circumstances was resolved years ago by the plain language of the
ADA and the proposed standard merely incorporates that
requirement.
Finally, and obviously, application of the proposed standard
would change the majority's (and district court's) determinations in
Johnson that (1) Johnson, because she did not satisfy the job
prerequisite of holding a current, valid Idaho teaching certificate, was
not a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA and (2) as
182. Id.; see also Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 379 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 732
F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[A]n individual facing a surmountable employment barrier is not
'otherwise qualified' if accommodation would require a substantial modification in the
requirements of the position, or would result in an undue administrative or financial burden
upon the federally assisted program sought to be charged pursuant to section 504." (citing Se.
Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410, 412 (1979))); Schmidt v. Bell, No. 82-1758, 1983 WL 631,
at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1983) (same); Weber, supra note 1, at 1124 (arguing that reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship are the opposite sides of the same coin, i.e. that the
existence of undue hardship will make a requested accommodation unreasonable).
183. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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such, the school district did not have a duty to reasonably
accommodate her. Those changes, however, would only change the
result in Johnson if, like the district court and unlike concurring and
dissenting Judge Paez, a majority of the court of appeals also believed
that the school district's failure to apply for provisional certification
from the SBE violated the school district's duty to reasonably
accommodate Johnson under the ADA.
According to the EEOC's interpretative guidance, a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA is "any change in the work
environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables
an individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment
opportunities."'8 As indicated by the district court in Johnson, and
although not yet directly addressed by the Supreme Court,'8 most
courts of appeals agree that the ADA requires that "[a]s long as a
reasonable accommodation available to the employer could have
plausibly enabled a ... [disabled] employee to adequately perform his
job, an employer is liable for failing to attempt the
accommodation."186

The district court in Johnson essentially got the reasonable
accommodation issue right - albeit in dicta. Thus, the district court
correctly pointed out that, in order for the school district to receive a
provisional certification from the SBE which would have permitted
Johnson to teach for the year while finishing her continuing education
course work, the school district only needed to certify the good faith
efforts it had made in attempting to replace Johnson with a
certificated teacher, and not that there were no certificated teachers
available in the school district.' 87 The district court also correctly
noted that, under and because of the plausibility standard, the
possibility that the SBE might deny the school district's application
184. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (2013); see also Porter,supra note 1, at 544 n.90 (discussing the
breadth and lack of limitations in this standard).
185. The Supreme Court has issued only one opinion in an ADA reasonable
accommodation case - US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). However, in Barnett,
the Court did not discuss the likelihood of success that a requested accommodation must have
in order for it to constitute a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.
186. Johnson v. Bd. of Trs. of Boundary Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 101, No. CV-09-61-N-BLW,
2010 WL 530070, at *9 (citing Humphreys v. Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1228, 1136 (9th Cir.
2001) and quoting Kimbro v. Atl. Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869, 879 (9th Cir. 1989)). In addition
to the Ninth Circuit, several other courts of appeals have adopted the plausibility standard. See,
e.g., McMillan v. New York, 711 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2013); Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer's
Res. Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 781 (6th Cir. 1998); Criado v. v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 444 (1st Cir.
1998); Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1343 (10th Cir. 1997) (Rehabilitation Act case).
187. See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also IDAHO STATE BD. OF EDUC., supra
note 86.
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was largely irrelevant.

In contrast, Judge Paez got the reasonable accommodation issue
wrong in his concurrence and dissent in Johnson - for several reasons.
First, Judge Paez, in stating that "the district was not required to
utilize the [provisional certification] procedure to rehire Johnson,"189
made no reference to the plausibility standard and, therefore, misses
the point recognized by the district court: if it was plausible that the
SBE would have granted the school district's request for a provisional
certificate for Johnson and thereby permit her to teach, then the
school district was required under the reasonable accommodation
provisions of the ADA to "change ... the way things are customarily
done" and make the request. And the record before the district court
and the Ninth Circuit indicated both that it was plausible - indeed,
almost certain - that the SBE would grant the school district a
provisional certificate authorizing Johnson to teach and further that,
by requesting authorization for Johnson, the school district did not
have to change the way things were customarily done. In this regard,
the record demonstrated that, both during the time that the school
district employed Johnson and after she was fired, the school district
applied for and received provisional certificates for numerous
teachers who did not hold regular teaching certificates. 9 0 Specifically,
Johnson submitted evidence, not rebutted by the school district, that
it had requested approximately twenty provisional certificates from
the SBE - a number of which were granted - during the last few years

of Johnson's employment and immediately thereafter. 9 ' However,
none of the judges in the case, including Judge Paez, discussed, let
alone analyzed, this evidence. 92
Second, Judge Paez believed that, because only the SBE, and not
the school district, had the authority to grant the provisional
188. Johnson,2010 WL 530070, at *9; see supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 103.
190. See supra note 111.
191. Id.
192. To his credit, Judge Paez, although not pointing to the record showing that the school
district had frequently requested that the SBE grant provisional certification to a number of
other - presumably, non-disabled - teachers, did point out, consistent with McDonald v.
Menino, No. 96-10825-RGS, 1997 WL 106955 (D. Mass. Jan. 3, 1997) (and with dicta in Williams
v. United Insurance Co. of America, 253 F.3d 280 (7th Cir.2001)), that facially neutral
qualification standards or job prerequisites that screen out an individual with disabilities (and
not necessarily a class of individuals with disabilities) may be actionable under the ADA and
give rise to a duty of reasonable accommodation on the part of the employer. Johnson v. Bd. of
Trs. of Boundary Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 101, 666 F.3d 561, 571 (9th Cir. 2011) (Paez, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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certification, that fact militated against requiring the school district to
request provisional authorization from the SBE. 93 However, nothing
in the reasonable accommodation provisions of the ADA itself, the
EEOC rules, the cases interpreting them, or the spirit of those
authorities suggests that an employer's obligation to provide a
reasonable accommodation to an individual with a disability hinges
on whether the end product of the accommodation granted must
come from the employer and not a third party.19 4 Thus, in Johnson,
the reasonable accommodation owed by the school district to
Johnson was the request for provisional certification from the SBE,
even though the end product of that request - the provisional
certificate itself - would have been issued by the SBE.'95 Certainly,
193. See supranote 102 and accompanying text.
194. As discussed previously, the standard proposed in this article does not depend on
whether the job prerequisite or qualification standard which is the subject of the reasonable
accommodation is solely employer-imposed or imposed by the employer due to a state or
federal law requirement. See supra note 161. This is not to say, however, that the origin of the
job prerequisite or qualification standard is irrelevant to the reasonable accommodation inquiry.
As a general matter, because waiver or modification of employer-imposed job prerequisites
often will not be costly or adversely consequential for an employer, employer objections to such
measures on reasonable accommodation or undue hardship grounds often will not be
meritorious. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. Conversely, although the author
was unable to locate any cases in the disability discrimination context, employer waiver or
modification of governmentally imposed requirements - particularly when they give rise to
fines, penalties, or other adverse consequences from governmental agencies such as the Internal
Revenue Service or Department of Transportation - will typically not constitute a reasonable
accommodation or will cause an undue hardship on the employer in the religious discrimination
context. See, e.g., United States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 891 (3d Cir. 1990); Bhatia v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Oak-Rite, Mfg. Corp., No.
IP99-1962-C-H/G, 2001 WL 1168156, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 27, 2001); Weber v. Leaseway
Dedicated Logistics, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1223 (D. Kan. 1998). Whatever the source of the
job prerequisite or qualification standard, the employer's duty or ability to waive or modify the
requirement can be sufficiently addressed under the reasonable accommodation and undue
hardship provisions of the ADA.
195. Judge Paez also believed that an SBE grant of provisional authorization to a school
district to allow a teacher who does not currently hold certification to teach is an exception to
the educator certification requirement under IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-1201 (2013). Johnson, 666
F.3d at 568 (Paez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, properly understood,
the SBE's decision to grant provisional authorization in those circumstances is a decision to
grant a provisional certificate to the teacher, not merely provisional authorization to the school
district. The SBE recognizes as much on its website by discussing provisional authorization
under a reference to IDAPA 08.02.02.016 which provides, under the heading, Idaho Educator
Credential, "[t]he State Board of Education authorizes the State Department of Education to
issue certificates and endorsements to those individuals meeting the specific requirements for
each area provided herein. (Section 33-1201, Idaho Code)." IDAHO STATE BD. OF EDUC., supra
note 86. Likewise, the district court judge in Johnson properly stated throughout his opinion
that Johnson asked the school district to obtain a provisionalcertificate on her behalf. See supra
notes 59-70 and accompanying text. Although the distinction was semantical for purpose of the
issue before the courts in Johnson, it may be crucial under other circumstances - such as where
an educator's right to compensation or other employment benefits may hinge on whether he or
she holds a certificate.
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there may be some cases where a requested accommodation would be
unreasonable because the employer has no ability to facilitate or
trigger the actions of a third party;' however, where, as in Johnson,
the employer must initiate the process under circumstances where the
accommodation may plausibly be granted by a third party, then the
employer's duty of reasonable accommodation under the ADA
would include making the request."
Third, Judge Paez relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingbury 8 in determining that that the school
district did not discriminate against Johnson when it refused to seek
provisional certification for her from the SBE.'99 There, the Supreme
Court held that the Albertson's grocery chain was not required by the
ADA to hire a truck driver for a position affecting interstate
commerce, despite the fact that the driver had obtained a waiver
under a temporary and experimental waiver program run by the
Federal Highway Administration for research purposes, when the
program did not change the applicable safety regulations.2 However,
unlike the employer in Albertson's, who eschewed an alternative
certification program for visual acuity testing as a "flawed
experiment," 201 the school district embraced the provisional
certification program as substantively "on par" with the ordinary
certification regime.2 Although the school district could have
rejected the SBE's policy decision that provisionally-certified
196. See, e.g., Hall v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., No. 10-7603, 2014 WL 1797415 at **4-6 & n.3
(E.D. Pa. May 6, 2014) (distinguishing Johnson on grounds that teacher had a valid emergency
permit when accomodation requested, but concluding as a matter of law that school district was
not obligated to reasonably accommodate teacher by requesting renewal of emergency permit
where state law and state department of education guidelines required school district to attempt
to fill teacher's position with a fully-certified applicant).
197. The requirement that a school district or its officials, rather than an individual
educator, make the request for provisional certification to the state licensing agency is not
unusual in public education. See Dancause v. Mount Morris Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 13-CV-6019,
2013 WL 2946063, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. June 14, 2013) ("Under New York law, a teacher may be
exempted from the certification requirement if the Superintendent of a school district certifies
that no certified teachers are available to teach the subject. If no certified teachers are available,
than [sic] an uncertified teacher may teach the subject.... It is uncontroverted that the
Superintendent did not certify to the State Board of Education that no certified teachers were
available to teach."); see also Mellin v. Flood Brook Union Sch. Dist., 790 A.2d 408, 425-26 (Vt.
2001) (superintendent, rather than teacher, must request waiver from state Department of
Education).
198. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
199. Johnson, 666 F.3d at 569 (Paez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200. Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 558, 577-78.
201. Id. at 561.
202. See Johnson, 666 F.3d at 568-69 (Paez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 571.
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teachers were acceptable for classroom employment, it instead
utilized that program to obtain certification for at least twenty
teachers between 2006 and 2009.203 Thus, as the Albertson's court
explained, an employer in the school district's position was therefore
"required to accept a waiver once obtained, and probably to provide
an applicant some opportunity to obtain a waiver whenever that was
reasonably possible." 204 Since Johnson was qualified for her position
in every way other than the lapse of her teaching certificate, the
school district was obligated to provide her an opportunity to obtain
the same provisional teaching certification it had authorized for
numerous other teachers. Because Albertson's was distinguishable
from Johnson, Judge Paez improperly replied on it in addressing the
reasonable accommodation issue in Johnson.
In sum, the proposed standard would have changed the result in
Johnson on the "otherwise qualified" issue and the proper application
of well-established principles of reasonable accommodation would
have allowed Johnson to prevail on her non-time-barred disability
discrimination claims as a whole.205
VI. PROPOSED NEXT STEPS

Because the Ninth Circuit's decision in Johnson is of relatively
recent vintage, its holding concerning the job prerequisites/reasonable
accommodation issue has not (yet) been applied in any significant
way by district or appellate courts in or outside of the Ninth Circuit.206
203. See supra note 111.
204. Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 571; see also Tingum v. Atl. Richfield Co., 34 P.3d 855, 858 n.3
(Wash. App. 2001) (distinguishing Albertson's, and possibly requiring employer to hire trucker,
where Washington's federally approved waiver program, was neither temporary nor
experimental, and changed the governing regulatory standards).
205. As discussed previously, Johnson argued before the Ninth Circuit that, as an exception
to the general rule not requiring an employer to assist an unqualified individual with a disability,
an employer should be required to reasonably accommodate an individual with a disability
"where the employer exercises significant control over an individual's ability to obtain jobrelated qualifications." See supra note 91 and accompanying text. In other words, Johnson
argued that the degree of an employer's control should factor in the determination of whether a
duty of reasonable accommodation even arises in the first instance. However, consistent with
this article's attempt to shift the analysis, i.e. to give more play to the ADA's reasonable
accommodation provisions (and less play to the qualified individual standard on the job
prerequisites issue), the degree of an employer's control over the ability of an individual to
satisfy job prerequisites should factor, not in determining whether a duty of reasonable
accommodation exists for an individual who cannot satisfy job prerequisites, but rather, in
determining whether a requested accommodation is reasonable or not under the circumstances.
206. For a recent district court opinion citing Johnson, but not specifically addressing or
applying its holding on the job prerequisites/reasonable accommodation issue, see Herron v.
Peri & Sons Farms, Inc. No. 3:13-cv-00075-HDM, 2014 WL 1917934, at **5 and 7 (D. Nev. May
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As such, the issue concerning whether an individual with a disability
is otherwise qualified and whether an employer owes that individual a
reasonable accommodation is likely a long way from attracting the
attention of the Supreme Court. However, the issue will almost
certainly arise in other federal and state courts207 - particularly in
those jurisdictions that have adopted the EEOC's two-step inquiry in
determining whether an individual with a disability is qualified under
the ADA.20 s
Under these circumstances, several options present themselves.
The first approach would be to essentially do nothing - that is, allow
cases raising the job prerequisite/reasonable accommodation issue to
continue to percolate through the lower courts with the EEOC
weighing in by either filing suit on behalf of an aggrieved plaintiff or,
as in Johnson, seeking leave to file and stating its position in an
amicus brief in a case filed by a private plaintiff. This approach,
however, would be inefficient in that it would leave resolution of the
issue to piecemeal determinations by district courts and courts of
appeals and might be ineffective if those courts, as did the Johnson
courts, reject the EEOC's position in favor of a contrary argument
asserted by an employer.
The second approach would be to seek a legislative fix, i.e. have
Congress amend the ADA and ADAAA to make clear that an
individual with a disability is otherwise qualified - and an employer
has a duty to reasonably accommodate such individual - under the
ADA where provision of a reasonable accommodation would enable
the individual to satisfy job prerequisites which the individual is
unable to satisfy because of his or her disability. This approach would
be consistent with the approach taken by disability rights advocates in
2008 after the Supreme Court interpreted the ADA narrowly to limit
the class of plaintiffs who fell within the definition of disability under
the Act. 9 However, the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the job
20

13, 2014) (holding that employee was not qualified for maintenance mechanic position where he
did not possess employer-mandated training certificates, but not addressing reasonable
accommodation issue, where employee did not request accommodation regarding lack of
certifcation); see also cases discussed supra at notes 82, 141 and 196.
207. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to the ADA or
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Hapgood v. City of Warren, 127 F.3d 490, 494 (6th Cir.
1997) (ADA claims); B.D. ex rel. S.D. v. Dazzo, No. 11-15347, 2012 WL 2711457, *6 (E.D.
Mich. July 9, 2012) (ADA and section 504 claims); Mercer v. Strange, 899 A.2d 683, 689 n.7
(Conn. App. 2004) (same); Elek v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 573 N.E.2d 1056, 1059-60 (Ohio
1991) (section 504 claims).
208. See supra note 82.
209. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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prerequisites/reasonable accommodation issue. Moreover, the issue,
although important, does not affect as many individuals - and,
therefore, is not of the same magnitude - as the disability coverage
issue. And, because of the two above-stated reasons and because of a
change in the composition of Congress since 2008, Congress would
not likely be inclined to legislate on the subject, let alone pass ADA
plaintiff-favoring legislation. For all of these reasons, this approach
would almost certainly not be fruitful.
The third approach would be for the EEOC to expressly
incorporate its litigation position in Johnson into its revised rules and
guidances. At least as to the regulations, this approach would require
public comment and therefore invite public scrutiny and opposition.210
If successful, however, this approach would constitute a singular
policy statement by the EEOC concerning the job prerequisite/reasonable accommodation issue and, therefore, constitute a
more forceful position than the litigation position taken by the EEOC
in Johnson. In essence, it would convert Auer deference into Chevron
deference 1 and enhance the likelihood that courts would defer to the
EEOC's position on the issue.21 2
21

210. Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, the EEOC would need to afford
notice-and-comment rights to the public and interested parties concerning promulgation or
revision of its substantive regulations, see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) and (c) (2012), but would not be
required to do so concerning adoption or revision of its interpretative guidances, id. §
553(b)(1)(A).
211. See Ann Graham, Searching for Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court and
Judicial Review of Agency Regulations, 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 229, 241-42 (2008) ("[Clourts apply
[Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)] deference when a case involves interpreting an
[ambiguous] agency regulation, and [Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)] deference when the case involves interpretation of an
ambiguous statute" and citing Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006)).
212. As discussed previously, both Auer deference and Chevron deference require that the
source of law interpreted be ambiguous. See supra notes 112, 144, 210 and accompanying text.
As also discussed above, the ADA's statutory provisions and the EEOC's regulations on the job
prerequisites/reasonable accommodation issue are ambiguous such that some level of judicial
deference to the EEOC's interpretation of either the ADA or the regulations interpreting
and/or enforcing it is appropriate. See supra notes 122-26, 150-51 and accompanying text. The
degree of deference owed to agency interpretations under Auer and Chevron is similar,
although not identical: under Auer, a court must defer to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations as long as the interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with regulation,
see supra note 92 and accompanying text, while under Chevron, a court must defer to agency's
interpretation of a statute as long as the interpretation constitutes a permissible construction of
the statute, see supra note 96. Thus, although the EEOC's revision of its regulations to adopt
the position taken by it on Johnson's appeal to the Ninth Circuit and the position proposed by
the author in this article would constitute a more efficient and uniform approach to stating the
EEOC's position on the job prerequisite/reasonable accommodation issue, it would not, as a
matter of administrative law relating to judicial deference, significantly change the applicable
legal standard. However, scholarly and Supreme Court sentiment to eliminate Auer deference
due to separation of powers concerns has recently been gaining traction. See John F. Manning,
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For these reasons, the EEOC should take the steps necessary to
revise its regulations and guidances concerning the job prerequisites
and reasonable accommodation issues to clarify that employers owe
individuals with a disability a duty of reasonable accommodation in
both job prerequisite and essential function cases.
VII. CONCLUSION

Congress took major strides in 2008 toward furthering the
original purposes of the ADA and restoring a proper balance
between the rights of employees and applicants and the obligations
and rights of employers by enacting the ADAAA. However, those
purposes remain unfulfilled and those rights and obligation remain
imbalanced due to less-than-clear legislative enactments by Congress
and regulations promulgated and guidances issued by the EEOC on
the job prerequisites/reasonable accommodation issue and due to
judicial decisions, like the Ninth Circuit's decision in Johnson, that do
not pay appropriate deference to the EEOC's stated position
concerning an issue and continue to read the ADA and its regulations
in a narrow fashion in favor of employers.
As such, the EEOC should forthwith promulgate regulations and
issue guidances restating the position that it took on the job
prerequisite/reasonable accommodation issue during the court of
appeals proceeding in Johnson and adopting the standard proposed
by this article on the issue. Likewise, courts should adopt and apply
that standard. That way, additional appropriate measures will be
taken toward removing inappropriate qualifications and barriers to
the rights of otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities under the
ADA.

Constitutional Structure and JudicialDeference to Agency Interpretation of Agency Rules, 96

COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996) and Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 131 S. Ct.
2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring), both cited in Christopher v. SmithKline Beacham
Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 (2012). See also Aneil Kovval, Note, Seminole Rock and the
Separationof Powers, 36 HARV. J. L. PUB. POL'Y, 849, 850 & n.12 (2013). Therefore, revision of
EEOC's regulations to reflect the proposed legal standard concerning the job
prerequisite/reasonable accommodation issue would be on stronger legal footing.

